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Screening Older Physicians 
for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or 
Discriminatory?  
Ilene N. Moore† 
Abstract 
In the U.S., one out of eight practicing 
physicians is older than sixty-five, and many 
practice well into their seventies. Many 
commentators and healthcare organizations, 
concerned that aging physicians are at risk for 
cognitive impairment, have urged, or actually 
instituted, cognitive “screening” for older 
physicians as a means to ensure patient safety. An 
age-based screening program, however, should not 
proceed unless supported by clear evidence and not 
prohibited by law. 
This article argues that neither of these 
conditions applies. Singling out all older 
physicians for cognitive testing is empirically 
unjustified and legally prohibited. Furthermore, 
there are other means to reliably monitor and 
identify physicians, both older and younger, who 
pose risk to patients. Legally, two federal statutes 
prohibit age-based screening. According to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the 
“ADEA”), age-based screening constitutes prohibited 
discrimination because it is based on unsupported 
stereotyping about age and imposes a burden on one 
set of employees while overlooking others. According 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (collectively, the 
“ADA”), age-based screening constitutes prohibited 
discrimination because an employer is only permitted 
to require medical examination when it has 
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reasonable belief that an individual has a condition 
that could interfere with job performance or the 
individual poses direct threat to others. The 
consequence of both these statutes is that hospitals 
cannot go on a “fishing expedition” and conduct en 
masse screening of their older medical staff; they 
can only examine those whom they have reason to 
believe may be impaired or otherwise dysfunctional. 
The article concludes by discussing processes and 
methodologies that facilitate identification of 
physicians of any age who may warrant further 
assessment. By enabling hospitals to identify 
physicians of all ages who pose risk to patient 
safety in a way that aligns with the principles of 
the ADEA and ADA, they can strike the appropriate 
balance between fostering patient safety and not 
discriminating against one physician demographic. 
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Introduction  
The U.S. health care system relies heavily on 
older physicians. Currently, one of eight practicing 
physicians is older than sixty-five, the traditional 
age of retirement.1 Some practice well into their 
seventies or beyond.2 Many commentators and health 
care organizations find this trend concerning and 
have urged or instituted,3 cognitive “screening” for 
 
1. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION 
IN THE US. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. (Table 1.1)(Derek R. 
Smart ed., 2015) (citing 2013 statistics). 
2. See Aaron Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed 
Physicians in the United States, 2016. 103 J. MED. REG. 
7, 10 (2017). 
3. See John Sanford, New Policy to Require Evaluations for 
Late-Career Practitioners, STAN. MED. July 16, 2012, 
https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2012/07/new-
policy-to-require-evaluations-for-late-career-
practitioners.html (Stanford Medical Center has since 
dropped its plan to institute cognitive screening). The 
following hospitals reportedly conduct some form of age-
based screening: Driscoll Children’s Hospital (Texas) 
and the University of Virginia Health System. see Sara 
Stankorb, Out of Practice, PROTO MAG (Jun 10, 2015), 
http://protomag.com/articles/out-of-practice, and 
Jewish Hospital and Saints Mary and Elizabeth Hospital 
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older physicians. Their argument is rooted in a 
perception that aging physicians threaten patient 
safety.4 This perception springs from several 
sources. One is the increasing prevalence of 
cognitive impairment with age in the general 
population,5 leading to the concern that some older 
physicians are affected but undiagnosed.6 Another is 
the belief that members of the medical community 
sometimes fail to intervene in cases of observed 
impairment.7 Moreover, screening proponents 
 
in Louisville, Kentucky and Portsmouth Regional Hospital 
in New Hampshire. Leigh Page, Should Doctors Be Tested 
for Competence at Age 65?, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/. 
4. Page, supra, note 3 (“Proponents of age-based testing 
say it’s no longer permissible to simply allow aging 
physicians to determine when they should retire, because 
many of them stay on after impairment sets in.”). 
5. W. M. van der Flier & P. Scheltens, Epidemiology and 
Risk Factors of Dementia, 76 J. NEUROLOGY. NEUROSURGERY &. 
PSYCHIATRY v2, v3 (2005). 
6. See, Richard Hyer. Cognitive Impairment in Older 
Physicians May be Widespread, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (2005). 
(While some estimate the number of cognitively impaired 
physicians based on the general population, there is 
little research in this area. A geriatrics specialist 
stated that he had “no idea what the prevalence” is of 
those “who remain in practice.”); Sheila M. LoboPrabbu 
et al., The Aging Physician with Cognitive Impairment: 
Approaches to Oversight, Prevention, and Remediation, 17 
AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 445, 453 (2009) (“Collecting 
more data on the aging physician with dementia is 
imperative . . . There is a dearth of information about 
the numbers . . . ”). 
7. See, e.g., Joy Daughtery Dickinson, As Surgeons Age, Are 
They Putting Your Program at Risk?, AHC MEDIA (Apr. 1, 
2013), https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/63084-as-
surgeons-age-are-they-putting-your-program-at-risk; 
Laurie Tarkan, As Doctors Age, Worries About Their 
Ability Grows, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/25/health/25doctors.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
Sandra G. Boodman, As Doctors Grow Older, Hospitals 
Begin Requiring Them to Prove They’re Still Fit, Wash.. 
Post. (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-doctors-
grow-older-hospitals-begin-requiring-them-to-prove-
theyre-still-fit/2012/12/10/42bb4d90-2d0e-11e2-a99d-
5c4203af7b7a_story.html?utm_term=.1706580d8f99; 
Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Physicians’ Perceptions, 
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advocate for the profession to take action so that 
others outside the profession do not do it for them.8 
Despite the impetus to do so, healthcare 
organizations should not institute an age-based 
cognitive screening program unless certain 
conditions are satisfied. These conditions are that 
clear evidence supports the rationale for the 
program and that the program is not legally 
prohibited. This Article argues that neither 
condition is currently met. 
Part I of this Article argues that the evidence 
does not support the need for across-the-board age-
based cognitive screening of late-career 
physicians. Part II argues that such screening is 
not justified because of screening tool limitations, 
risk of misdetection and misinterpretation, and 
insufficient data regarding costs, benefits, harms, 
and cost-effectiveness of such programs. Part III 
argues that two federal statutes prohibit age-based 
screening. Under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 19679 (the “ADEA”), such screening 
is unlawful discrimination because it imposes 
burdens on older physicians on the basis of age. 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
 
Preparedness for Reporting, and Experiences Related to 
Impaired and Incompetent Colleagues, 304 JAMA 187, 191 
(2010); Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in 
Medicine: Results of a National Survey of Physicians, 
147 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 795, 798 (2007). 
8. See COUNCIL ON MED. EDUC., AM. MED. ASS’N, REP.5-A-15: 
COMPETENCY AND THE AGING PHYSICIAN 12 (2015), available at 
https://www.cppph.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/AMA-
Council-on-Medical-Education-Aging-Physician-Report-
2015.pdf. [hereinafter Report 5](“Formal guidelines on 
the timing and content of testing of 
competence . . . may head off a call for mandatory 
retirement ages or imposition of guidelines by 
others.”); LoboPrabbu et al., supra note 6, at 452 
(stating “In the absence of professional initiatives to 
address the issue of the aging impaired physician, 
civic, and consumer healthcare organizations concerned 
with assuring optimal medical care may take the lead.”). 
9. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621-634 (2006). 
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and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)10 
(collectively, the “ADA”), age-based screening is 
prohibited discrimination because it constitutes an 
inquiry and examination without cause and violates 
the requirements of the “business necessity” 
exception. This section also argues that even if the 
hospital does not directly employ the physician, the 
hospital is the “employer” for purposes of the ADEA 
and the ADA and must comply with their requirements. 
Finally, Part IV suggests alternative methodologies 
for identifying physicians who pose a risk to 
patient safety. It argues that existing common-law 
doctrines and private and public regulations provide 
the incentives, authority, and framework for 
hospital leaders and medical staff to use non-
discriminatory methods and processes to identify 
impaired physicians, regardless of age. These 
methodologies and processes align with the 
principles of the ADEA and the ADA, thereby striking 
an appropriate balance between promoting patient 
safety and treating physician employees in a fair, 
equitable, and legally authorized manner. 
I.  Age Not a Valid Basis for Imposing Testing 
on Physicians 
Twenty-nine percent (29%) of the one million 
licensed physicians are sixty or older.11 While not 
all licensees are engaged in active practice, 
111,000 physicians sixty-five or older account for 
12 percent of all physicians delivering patient 
care.12 Physicians are also retiring later. The mean 
retirement age was 63.3 in 2005, but by 2014 
increased to 67.7 years.13 Furthermore, the number 
 
10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ § 12101 et. seq. and ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA), Pub. L. 110–325. 
11. See Young et al., supra note 2, at 10, 14. 
12. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 1 (citing 2013 statistics). 
13. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE COMPLEXITIES OF 
PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS FROM 2014 TO 2025: 2016 
UPDATE, 35 (2016), available at 
https://www.aamc.org/downloa
d/458082/data/2016_complexities_of_supply_and_demand_p
rojections.pdf [hereinafter AAMC] 
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of actively practicing physicians sixty and older 
increased 30 percent between 2010 and 2016, while 
the number of physicians forty-nine or younger 
increased by only 10 percent.14 
The fact that many physicians continue practicing 
beyond the traditional retirement age comes at an 
opportune time because the U.S. faces a physician 
shortage within the next decade.15 Estimates of the 
deficit are that it will reach 61,700 to 94,700 
physicians by 2025.16 However, there are 
countervailing concerns that older physicians may 
have deficiencies in the neuropsychological 
functions required to practice competently. Such 
functions include verbal problem-solving, visual-
spatial problem-solving, learning and memory, 
verbal fluency, attention, and mental tracking.17 
Because availability and quality of care are both 
critical public goals, these concerns must be 
addressed. 
If a plausible argument is to be made for 
screening a specific population for cognitive 
impairment, the evidence should carefully 
demonstrate the necessity of such screening. 
Policymakers and healthcare leaders must base 
decision-making on accurate information so they may 
properly balance the benefits, risks, and costs of 
such a program. Failure to do so does a disservice 
to the targeted group and shifts attention away from 
other opportunities to improve quality and safety.18 
Those seeking to screen late-career physicians 
and devote resources must demonstrate that this 
group of physicians presents sufficient risk to 
patient safety to warrant proceeding. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the evidence 
 
14. See Young et al., supra note 2, at 14. 
15. Id. at 9; see also Atul Grover et al., The Nation’s 
Physician Workforce and Future Challenges, 351 AM. J. 
MED. SCI. 11, 12 (2016). 
16. AAMC, supra note 13, at V. 
17. John Turnbull et al., Competence and Cognitive 
Difficulty in Physicians: A Follow-up Study. 81 ACAD. 
MED. 915, 916-17 (2006). 
18. See Joel M. Kupfer, The Graying of US Physicians: 
Implications for Quality and the Future Supply of 
Physicians. 315 JAMA 341, 341-42 (2016). 
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regarding the relationship between physician age and 
physician performance. 
A.  Effects of Aging on Cognitive Function 
Normal aging is typically accompanied by changes 
in physical and cognitive function. Physical changes 
include decline in oxygen consumption rates, kidney 
function, and cardiovascular function.19 Using the 
MicroCog Assessment of Cognitive Functioning20 to 
evaluate cognition with aging, Powell demonstrated 
that reasoning, visuospatial ability, and memory and 
reasoning decline before attention and calculation 
skills.21 Mean performance scores for language, 
visual-spatial recognition, reasoning, and 
attention show a sharper decline after age 65.22 The 
magnitude of these changes, however, becomes 
increasingly variable with each decade. Benton, for 
example, found that one-third of octogenarians 
performed as well as a group of younger adults on 
nine separate cognitive tests.23 Overall MicroCog 
scores for a group of seventy-year olds were lower 
than scores for a group of forty-year olds, but the 
60 percent increase in intra-group variability meant 
that many older individuals performed as well as 
those who were much younger.24 A review of 185 
gerontological studies confirmed that variability 
continues to increase with age.25 
 
19. DOUGLAS H. POWELL & DEAN K. WHITLA PROFILES IN COGNITIVE AGING 68-
69 (1994). 
20. Id. at 23-27 and 220 (n. 1) (The MicroCog is a 
computerized set of testing modules developed by D.H 
Powell, E.F. Kaplan, D.K. Whitla, et al. Subtests 
examine reaction time, attention, numeric recall, verbal 
memory, visuospatial facility, reasoning, and mental 
calculation.).  
21. Id. at 74. 
22. Id. at 202. 
23. A. L. Benton et al., Normative Observations on 
Neuropsychological Test Performances in Old Age, 3 J 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 33, 38 (1981). 
24. Powell & Whitla, supra note 19, at 13. 
25. E.A. Nelson & D. Dannefer. Age Heterogeneity: Fact or 
Fiction? The Fate of Diversity in Gerontological 
Research, 32 THE GERONTOLOGIST 17, 19 (1992). 
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Unlike the changes that commonly accompany aging, 
cognitive impairment represents a spectrum of 
disability that ranges from mild cognitive 
impairment (“MCI”) to severe dementia.26 Patients 
with MCI are usually older and have memory 
complaints but no other functional impairments.27 
“Dementia” refers to a group of symptoms caused by 
permanent damage to the brain’s nerve cells28. These 
symptoms include loss of memory, judgment, language, 
complex motor skills, and other intellectual 
functions.29 Alzheimer’s accounts for 70 percent of 
cases, but dementia may also result from vascular 
events (strokes), Lewy bodies (abnormal proteins in 
the brain that disrupt neurologic function), alcohol 
abuse, frontotemporal deterioration, or trauma.30 
Prevalence estimates for dementia in the general 
population vary. One study, for example, estimated 
0.8 percent prevalence among 65-69 year olds31 with 
doublings of cases for every successive five-year 
period.32 Others note an overall 5 percent prevalence 
 
26. See Perminder S. Sachdev et al., Classifying the 
Neurocognitive Disorders: the DSM-5 Approach, 10 NATURE 
REV. NEUROLOGY 634, 641 (2014). (The latest version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
brings diseases resulting in cognitive impairment under 
one umbrella called Neurocognitive Disorders, Major and 
Minor). 
27. See Lesley J. Ritchie & Holly Tuokko, Mild Cognitive 
Impairment: Case Definitions, Age, and Other Risk 
Factors, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REHAB. 1 (Stone JH, Blouin 
M, eds 2013); David G. Le Couteur et al., Political Drive 
to Screen for Pre-Dementia: Not Evidence Based and 
Ignores the Harms of Diagnosis. 347 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 2 
(2013). 
28. National Institute on Aging, What Happens to the Brain 
in Alzheimer’s Disease?, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RESOURCES, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-happens-
brain-alzheimers-disease (accessed Dec. 6, 2017). 
29. See Sachdev et al., supra note 26, at 636. 
30. Id. at 639; Ron Brookmeyer et al., National Estimates of 
the Prevalence of Alzheimer’s Disease in the United 
States, 7 ALZHEIMERS DEMENTIA 61, 69 (2011). 
31. Van der Flier, supra note 5, at v3. 
32. Id.; A.F. Jorm & D. Jolley, The Incidence of Dementia, 
51 NEUROLOGY 728, 728 (1998). 
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among 71-79 year olds.33 Aging post-World War II 
“baby boomers” will add to the number of Alzheimer’s 
cases.34 
B.  Evidence that Late-Career Physicians Function 
Well 
One cannot assume, however, that the prevalence 
of dementia among working physicians in their 
sixties and seventies is equal to that in the 
general population. The reasons why physicians 
retire are not always known,35 but there is evidence 
that some depart because they perceive they are 
practicing less competently than they once did.36 
Powell noted that by age seventy-five, non-retired 
physicians have superior visual-spatial, verbal 
memory, attention and calculation skills relative 
to their retired peers.37 He concluded that the most 
likely explanation was that these physicians were 
 
33. B. L. Plassman et al. Prevalence of Dementia in the 
United States: The Aging, Demographics, and Memory 
Study. 29 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 128 (Table 2) (2007); 
Brookmeyer et al., supra note 30, at 69 (Table 3). 
34. Alzheimer’s Association, New Analysis Shows More Than 28 
Million Baby Boomers Will Develop Alzheimer’s Disease; 
Will Consume Nearly 25% Of Medicare Spending (Jul 20, 
2015). https://www.alz.org/aaic/_downloads/mon-930am-
baby-boomers.pdf. 
35. Tania Haddad, Cognitive Assessment in the Practice of 
Medicine-Dealing with the Aging Physician, PHYSICIAN 
EXECUTIVE J. 14, 16 (July & Aug. 2013). See also, John 
Harrison, Doctors’ Health and Fitness to Practise: The 
Need for a Bespoke Model of Assessment, 58 OCCUPATIONAL 
MED. 323, 324, 325 (2008) (stating that the most common 
reasons for early retirement in the U.K. are psychiatric 
disorders (e.g., depression, bipolar disease), 
musculoskeletal disorders, and cardiovascular disease). 
36. See Linus A. Bieliaskus et al., Cognitive Changes and 
Retirement Among Senior Physicians (CCRASS): Results 
from the CCRASS Study, 207 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 69, 73-75 
(2008) (The mismatch between subjective perception of 
decline and objective measurement on cognitive testing 
suggests that self-perception of decline may not always 
be valid, that the testing is not sensitive enough, or 
that some individuals mistake the typical changes of 
aging as a threat to their ability to practice at a level 
they would like.). 
37. Powell & Whitla, supra note 19, at 202-03. 
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at the top of the intra-group variability range,38 
suggesting that a self-selection process is at work. 
Another study39 administered computerized cognitive 
tests to two groups of surgeons, one between 45-59 
years of age and the other 60-86 years of age.40 The 
tests evaluated rapid visual information 
processing, reaction time and psychomotor speed, and 
visuospatial processing.41 While the overall 
performance of the older physician group was below 
that of the younger physicians, a majority of 
individuals within the older group fell within the 
performance range of the younger group.42 
Several other studies have also shown that 
physicians in their sixties and beyond continue to 
function well and benefit their patients.43 A study 
sponsored by the American College of Surgery, for 
example, found that half of practicing surgeons over 
sixty-five reported no reduction in the complexity 
of their caseload, and that the majority continue 
to learn and contribute to new technology.44 Many 
studies also demonstrate that older physicians have 
favorable clinical outcomes. Reviewing complication 
and mortality rates for a cohort of 15,000 
individuals in Illinois who underwent segmental 
colon resection, one researcher observed that the 
most experienced surgeons achieved the lowest 
mortality rates.45 Epstein et al. found that 
 
38. Id.; see also Benton et al., supra note 23. 
39. Lauren L. Drag et al., Cognitive Functioning, Retirement 
Status, and Age: Results from the Cognitive Changes and 
Retirement among Senior Surgeons Study, 211 J. AM. C. 
SURGERY 303 (2010). 
40. Id. at 305 (Table 1). 
41. Id. at 304. 
42. Id. at 306. 
43. Kupfer, supra note 18, at 341-42; Kevin W. Eva, The Aging 
Physician: Changes in Cognitive Processing and Their 
Impact on Medical Practice, 77 ACAD. MED. S1 (2002). 
44. H. Jin Lee et al. Results from the Cognitive Changes and 
Retirement among Senior Surgeons Self-Report Study, J. 
AM. C. SURG. 668, 669-670 (2009). 
45. See Jay B. Prystowsky et al., Patient Outcomes for 
Segmental Colon Resection According to Surgeon’s 
Training, Certification, and Experience, 132 SURGERY 663, 
663 (2002). 
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obstetricians’ maternal complication rates 
continued to decrease over thirty years of medical 
practice.46 
Older physicians who maintain a high-volume 
practice appear to preserve their clinical skills. 
Waljee et al., for example, found that for the 
majority of procedures, patient outcomes for 
surgeons over sixty were comparable to those of 
younger peers.47 The exception was higher mortality 
rates for three specific complex procedures when 
performed by surgeons who did these procedures 
infrequently.48 A recent article also demonstrated 
that the 30-day mortality rate (patient deaths 
within 30 days of admission) for physicians over 
sixty who treat a high volume of elderly inpatients 
is similar to that of younger physicians in the same 
milieu.49 McAlister et al. found no differences in 
outcomes at seven teaching hospitals irrespective 
 
46. Andrew J. Epstein et al. Association between Physicians’ 
Experience after Training and Maternal Obstetrical 
Outcomes: Cohort Study, 346 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 3 ((2013). 
47. Jennifer F. Waljee et al., Surgeon Age and Operative 
Mortality in the United States. 244 ANNALS SURGERY 353, 359 
(2006). 
48. Id. at 357. See also, Liam O’Neill, Douglas Lanska, 
Arthur Hartz, Surgeon Characteristics Associated with 
Mortality and Morbidity Following Carotid 
Endarterectomy, 55 NEUROLOGY 773, 775 (2000) (finding 
higher 30-day mortality rate for low volume (1-2 
procedures per year) surgeons.). But see, Arthur J. 
Hartz, Evelyn M. Kuhn, Jose Pulido, Prestige of Training 
Programs and Experience of Bypass Surgeons as Factors in 
Adjusted Patient Mortality Rates, 37 MED. CARE 93, 101 
(1999). (finding years in practice was associated with 
higher mortality ratios for coronary bypass procedures 
after controlling for volume. The authors noted that 
younger surgeons receive training “in the newer and most 
effective surgical techniques” but also considered that 
older physicians’ skills may decline.). 
49. See Yusuke Tsugawa et al. Physician Age and Outcomes in 
Elderly Patients in Hospital in the U.S.: Observational 
Study, 357 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 5 (2017) (noting also that low 
volume offers less reinforcement of skills and that, 
while younger hospitalists receive specialized 
hospitalist training, older physicians tend to convert 
a general internal medicine practice into a hospitalist 
practice. (Id. at 7-8). The authors did not suggest 
cognitive differences caused the findings.). 
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of physician experience (years in practice ranged 
from four to fifty-five years50), patient volume, 
diagnosis, or patient complexity.51 
Late-career physicians generally perform well in 
other ways. Many evolve their practice and assume 
new roles over time.52 BeyondBlue, an Australian 
study analyzing physicians of all ages, found that 
those above 60 had the lowest rates of suicidal 
ideation, anxiety, depression, burnout, and 
“cynicism.”53 Another study noted that physicians 
between fifty-five and sixty-four were no more 
likely to have recurrent paid malpractice claims 
than physicians between forty-five and fifty-four.54 
The researchers did not analyze claims for those 
over sixty-four. Other research shows that the over-
65 physician population enjoys the lowest medical 
malpractice claims rate,55 as well as the fewest 
 
50. Finlay A. McAlister et al. Physician Experience and 
Outcomes Among Patients Admitted to General Internal 
Medicine Teaching Wards, 187 CANADIAN MED. J. ASS’N 1041, 
1044 (2015). 
51. Id. at 1045. 
52. Carmelle Peisah et al., Medical Masters: A Pilot Study 
of Adaptive Ageing in Physicians, 28 AUSTRALASIAN J. ON 
AGEING 134, 137 (2009). 
53. BEYONDBLUE, NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH SURVEY OF DOCTORS AND MEDICAL 
STUDENTS (2013), available at 
https://www.beyondblue.org.au/docs/default-
source/research-project-files/bl1132-report---nmhdmss-
full-report_web. 
54. David M. Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics 
of Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims, 374 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 354, 359 (2016). 
55. Mark I. Taragin et al., Physician Demographics and the 
Risk of Medical Malpractice, 93 AM. J MED. 537, 539 (1992) 
(“A physician’s risk of having a claim filed against 
him/her was greatest between the ages of 36 and 55, 
peaking around 40.”) 
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unsolicited patient complaints,56 a marker for 
medical malpractice risk.57 
The availability of newer analytic techniques 
provides fresh insights into physician performance 
over the course of their careers. One study used big 
data—124 quality measures from RAND’s Quality 
Assessment tools, 10,408 Massachusetts physicians, 
and claims from 1.13 million adult patients filed 
with the state’s major commercial health plans—to 
analyze physician characteristics against quality 
metrics.58 Practice experience ranged from fewer 
than ten years to more than fifty years.59 The 
results showed no relationship between quality and 
a physician’s years of experience.60 The size of the 
study population and the inclusion of physicians 
across a wide age spectrum make the results of this 
study worth considering because it provides a larger 
perspective of how well older physicians function 
in practice. 
 
56. Cherie A. Fathy et al., Association Between 
Ophthalmologist Age and Unsolicited Complaints, JAMA 
OPHTHALMOLOGY E1, E3, Nov. 30, 2017 (“The oldest age band 
(>70 years) had . . . the lowest complaint rate (0.71 
complaints per 1000 follow-up days vs 1.41 for age 61 
to 70 years, 1.84 for 51 to 60 years, 2.02 for 41 to 50 
years, and 1.88 for 31 to 40 years.”). 
57. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and 
Malpractice Risk, 287 JAMA 2951, 2955 (2002); Ilene N. 
Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and 
Addressing Medical Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1175, 1197-1199 (2006); Gerald B. Hickson et al., 
Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk in a Regional 
Healthcare Center, 100 S. MED. J. 791, 794 (2007); see 
also, Rita K. Cydulka et al. Association of Patient 
Satisfaction with Complaints and Risk Management Among 
Emergency Physicians, 41 J. EMERGENCY MED. 405, 408 (2011); 
Osnat Levtzion-Korach et al., Integrating Incident Data 
from Five Reporting Systems to Assess Patient Safety: 
Making Sense of the Elephant, 36 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUAL. & PATIENT SAFETY 402, 408 (2010); and Henry T. Stelfox 
et al., The Relation of Patient Satisfaction with 
Complaints against Physicians and Malpractice Lawsuits, 
118 AM. J. MED. 1126, 1131 (2005). 
58. Rachel L. Orler et al., Associations Between Physician 
Characteristics and Quality of Care, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 1442, 1443-45 (2010). 
59. See id. 
60. See id. at 1445. 
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C.  Limitations of Studies Cited as Evidence of the 
Need for Age-Based Testing  
 Many of the studies that age-based screening 
advocates cite to support their position are not 
relevant to their argument or are misapplied. 
Studies and commentators sometimes conflate 
concepts, misstate information, offer little data 
specific to the demographic of interest, or ignore 
other non-age-related physician characteristics 
associated with performance and cognition issues. 
1. Concept Conflation 
Most studies about physician dyscompetency or 
performance do not involve cognitive evaluation. 
Dyscompetency and cognitive impairment are 
different constructs, although some individuals 
manifest both.61 Dyscompetency, “a failure to 
maintain acceptable standards in one or more areas 
of professional practice,” may be due to lack of 
training or failure to stay current with standards 
of practice.62 Impairment, on the other hand, is “the 
inability of a physician to practice medicine with 
reasonable skill and safety by virtue of a mental 
or physical illness or excessive use or abuse of a 
controlled substance, alcohol, or other substances 
that impair ability.”63 By conflating the concepts 
of dyscompetency and cognitive impairment, those who 
support age-based cognitive screening claim a larger 
literature than actually exists. 
Concept conflation can also lead to propagation 
of errors easily missed unless the reader consults 
the original source. A case in point is Wilson et 
al.’s study of harm-causing medical “adverse events” 
(“AEs”), which found that “cognitive 
 
61. See, e.g., John Turnbull et al., Cognitive Difficulty in 
Physicians, 75 ACAD. MED. 177, 180 (2000) [hereinafter 
Turnbull, 2000]; Neha Kataria et al., A Retrospective 
Study of Cognitive Function in Doctors and Dentists with 
Suspected Performance Problems: An Unsuspected but 
Significant Concern, 5 ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 1,3 (2016). 
62. Betsy W. Williams, The Prevalence and Special Educational 
Requirements of Dyscompetent Physicians, 26 J. CONTINUING 
EDUC. HEALTH PROFESSIONS 173, 174 (2006). 
63. Id. 
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failure . . . appears to have a role in 57% of all 
the causes of AEs.”64 In the paper, the authors cited 
Leape65 who writes about the ubiquitous problem of 
error in medicine, and healthcare professionals’ 
vulnerabilities to making “errors of cognition.”66 
Several authors later cited Wilson et al. and 
transformed the term “cognitive failure”—synonymous 
with Leape’s “errors of cognition”—into “cognitive 
impairment.”67 A misstatement that 57 percent of 
adverse events are caused by cognitive impairment 
is not only untrue, but it has the potential to lead 
readers to believe that neurocognitive disorders 
account for the majority of cases of harm-causing 
medical error in the United States.68 Perry and Crean 
are among those who misquoted Wilson, but in their 
case additionally inflated the statistic, from 57 
 
64. Ross McL Wilson et al., An Analysis of the Causes of 
Adverse Events from The Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study, 170 MED. J. AUSTL. 411 (1999). 
65. Id. 
66. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1852 
(1994) (“All humans err frequently.” Leape encourages 
conscious “error proofing” of the medical care 
environment to help address the cultural and 
psychological human factors that lead to ongoing medical 
error.). See generally, JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1st ed. 
1990); Pat Crosskerry, The Importance of Cognitive 
Errors in Diagnosis and Strategies to Minimize Them, 78 
ACAD. MED 775, 777 (2003) (categorizing 32 types of 
cognitive error that lead to diagnostic error); Saul N. 
Weingart et al. Epidemiology of Medical Error, 320 BRIT. 
MED. J. 774, 791 (2000) (noting that clinicians who are 
inexperienced or undertake new techniques are prone to 
error). 
67. See e.g., Mervi Pitkanen et al., Doctor’s Health and 
Fitness to Practice: Performance Problems in Doctors and 
Cognitive Impairments, 58 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 328, 328 
(2008); Kataria et al., supra note 61, at 1; Betsy W. 
Williams et al., Assessment of Fitness for Duty of 
Underperforming Physicians: The Importance of Using 
Appropriate Norms, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2017)[. 
68. See Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS (2000) (estimating 
that 98,000 deaths are caused each year in the United 
States by medical error). 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
111 
percent to 63 percent,69 as did Pitkanen et al.70 It 
is unclear whether conflating terms contributes to 
the push to test older physicians, but these 
examples illustrate how misstatements at best create 
confusion and at worst, a false perception of an 
urgent need to “do something” about these “dangerous 
doctors.” 
The conflation of dyscompetency and impairment 
concepts additionally disadvantages older 
physicians by suggesting that they should no longer 
practice if identified as dyscompetent. Eva71 points 
out that when an older physician is dyscompetent, 
the primary indicators are out-of-date medical 
knowledge and a decline in data-gathering and 
analytic confirmation strategies.72 This does not 
mean, however, that the physician is incompetent to 
practice medicine.73 Older physicians have superior 
non-analytic skills by which they use their 
experience to generate diagnoses based on contextual 
information.74 Less use of analytic strategies, 
however, may at times result in premature closure75—
finalizing a diagnosis before fully verifying76—and 
misdiagnosis. Eva shares the insight that some of 
the negativity about older physicians likely derives 
from a belief they cannot change.77 Yet, he notes, 
 
69. William Perry & Rebecca D. Crean, A Retrospective Review 
of the Neuropsychological Test Performance of Physicians 
Referred for Medical Infractions, 20 ARCHIVES CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 161, 162 (2005). 
70. Pitkanen et al., supra note 67, at 328. 
71. Eva, supra note 43, at S1. 
72. Id. at S2. 
73. Id.at S4. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. See also, Leape, supra note 66, at 1853 (discussing 
“biased memory” as one cause of medical error. 
“Decisions are based on what is in our memory, but memory 
is biased toward overgeneralization and 
overregularization of the commonplace. Familiar patterns 
are assumed to have universal applicability because they 
usually work. We see what we know.”). 
76. See, Crosskerry, supra note 66, at 778; AHRQ, U.S., Dept 
of Health and Human Services, Diagnostic Errors (June 
2017). 
77. Eva, supra note 43, at S2. 
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specific education can remediate and strengthen 
analytic skills.78 Turnbull, too, points out that 
both older and younger dyscompetent physicians are 
able to successfully remediate provided the absence 
of neurocognitive impairment.79 
Schenarts and Cemaj’s article about the aging 
surgeon80 conflates data and juxtaposes text in a 
way that also tends to create misimpression about 
older physicians. In a section entitled “Psychiatric 
Illness,” they discuss “mental and psychiatric 
disease . . . in the elderly physician.”81 After 
listing various conditions that can cause 
impairment,82 they include the BeyondBlue83 study’s 
finding that: “[N]early 10% of surgeons reported 
having suicidal ideation in the previous year. In 
the same study 2.5% of surgeons had serious 
psychological distress, and 20.5% had a high 
likelihood of a minor psychiatric disorder.”84 The 
juxtaposition suggests that these data refer to 
older physicians, the subject of their article. In 
fact, the authors mis-cite the BeyondBlue study. The 
BeyondBlue data they include are for all surgeons. 
BeyondBlue also published data specific to 
physicians over sixty, which the authors do not 
mention. The respective corresponding percentages 
for these older physicians — 6%,85 0.9%,86 and 12.8%.87 
— were far lower than for all surgeons. 
The concern is that studies that conflate 
concepts and propagate erroneous statistics may 
create faulty perceptions that then underlie 
questionable polices. The California Public 
 
78. Id.at S5. 
79. Turnbull et al., supra note 17, at 918. 
80. Paul J. Schenarts & Samuel Cemaj, The Aging Surgeon: 
Implications for the Workforce, the Surgeon, and the 
Patient, 96 SURGICAL CLINICS N. AM. 129, 129 (2016). 
81. Id. at 133. 
82. Id. 
83. BeyondBlue, supra note 53. 
84. Schenarts & Cemaj, supra note 80, at 133. 
85. BeyondBlue, supra note 53, at 33 (Table 16). 
86. Id. at 23 (Table 9). 
87. Id. at 21 (Table 8). 
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Protection and Physician Health, Inc. (“CPPPH”)88 
has already issued guidelines for healthcare 
organizations considering age-based screening. 
These guidelines recommend a comprehensive 
assessment of older physicians that includes a 
cognitive screen.89 They present “the clinical case 
for assessing late-career practitioners”90 in a 
brief discussion and refer to an additional short 
reference list of articles, written largely by 
commentators.91 The brief discussion cites the 
Pitkanen article92 for its reference to the Perry 
and Crean study.93 CPPPH’s indirect inclusion of this 
reference to support age-based policies is 
problematic, because while the study found 
neuropsychological deficits among physicians with 
performance issues,94 there were no analyses that 
suggested a special concern with late-career 
physicians.95 CPPPH also cites the previously 
mentioned study by Waljee et al.,96 stating that 
older surgeons had higher mortality rates for some 
complex procedures.97 CPPPH does not mention the 
favorable outcomes for high volume surgeons 
comparable to younger colleagues’, nor does it 
 
88. California Public Protection and Physician Health, Inc., 
Assessing Late Career Practitioners: Policies and 
Procedures for Age-Based Screening, (April 2015), 
http://www.cppph.org/cppph/wp-content/uploads/2015/
07/assessing-late-career-practitioners-adopted-by-
cppph-changes-6-10-151.pdf [hereinafter CPPPH]. 
89. Id. at 8. (“physical examination, assessments from peers 
and co-workers, and assessment of cognitive function.”) 
90. Id. at 5-6. 
91. CPPPH, supra note 88, at 33. 
92. Id. at 5-6. 
93. Perry & Crean, supra note 69. 
94. Id. at 168. 
95. Authors expressly cautioned against drawing definitive 
conclusions from his study because subjects were not 
compared to a non-referred, age-matched comparison 
group. Id. at 167-68. 
96. See generally, Waljee et al., supra note 47. 
97. CPPPH, supra note 88, at 5. 
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include the authors’ conclusion that “surgeon age 
is not an important predictor of operative risk.”98 
CPPPH lists the California Medical Association 
and California Hospital Association’s Center for 
Healthcare Medical Executives as contributors to the 
guidelines.99 The imprimateur of these influential 
organizations implies they endorse the guidelines’ 
findings. The American Medical Association 
(“AMA”)’s Council on Medical Education’s 
“Competency and the Aging Physician” report, in 
turn, referenced the CPPPH guidelines.100 The AMA 
report noted that the guidelines offer “options for 
assessing physicians who choose to work late into 
their careers.”101 The report ultimately concluded 
that there was “a need to . . . establish guidelines 
for . . . testing . . . aging/late career 
physicians’ competence to care for patients.”102 
2. Lack of Age Stratification 
Much of the research cited in support of age-
based screening programs fails to elucidate specific 
information about the late-career physicians who 
would be the target of such programs. To begin with, 
the studies generally do not stratify findings 
sufficiently to distinguish between mid- and late-
career physicians.103 Other studies focus on unique 
 
98. See, Waljee et al, supra note 47, at 360. 
99. CPPPH, supra note 88, at 4. 
100. Report 5, supra note 8, at 6. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 1. The AMA report articulated two Directive[s] to 
Take Action: The first was to “identify organizations 
that should participate in the development of guidelines 
and methods of screening and assessment to assure that 
aging/late career physicians remain able to provide safe 
and effective care for patients. The second was to 
“encourage organizations identified by the AMA to work 
together to develop preliminary guidelines for 
assessment of the aging/late career physician and 
develop a research agenda . . . that could . . . serve 
as the basis for guidelines more grounded in research 
findings.” Id. at 13. 
103. See, e.g., William N. Southern et al., Longer Lengths of 
Stay and Higher Risk of Mortality among Inpatients of 
Physicians with More Years of Practice, 124 AM. J. MED. 
868, 873 (Table 1) (2011) (no stratification of group 
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populations of physicians referred by licensing 
authorities or hospitals to remediation/assessment 
centers104 for concerns about competency105 or 
negligence106 Many of the studies also have design 
limi-tations, such as small sample size, non-random 
sampling, or lack of controls, which may limit 
generalizability of the findings.107 Extrapolating 
conclusions from such studies to the physician 
community-at-large therefore requires great 
caution.108 
Choudhry et al.’s 109 oft-cited110 meta-analysis of 
sixty-two studies evaluated various quality of care 
 
with >20 years of practice); J. Sanford Schwartz et al., 
Internists’ Practices in Health Promotion and Disease 
Promotion, 114 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 46 (1991) (oldest study 
group is >/=56 years old). 
104. See, e.g., Alma Saravia, Determining Whether a Physician 
is Competent to Practice Medicine is Complex, MD (Sept 8, 
2017), http://www.mdmag.com/physicians-money-
digest/lifestyle/determining-whether-a-physician-is-
competent-to-practice-medicine-is-complex; LoboPrabbu 
et al., supra note 6, at 448. For a list of programs, 
including many to which state medical boards refer, see 
Federation of State Medical Boards, Directory of 
Physician Assessment and Remedial Education Programs, 
http://www.fsmb.org/globalassets/usmle-step3/spexplas-
pdfs/remedprog.pdf. 
105. See Geoffrey R. Norman et al., Competency Assessment of 
Primary Care Physicians as Part of a Peer Review Program, 
270 JAMA 1046, 1048-49 (1993). 
106. See, e.g., Perry & Crean, supra note 69, at 163. 
107. See Kupfer, supra note 18, at 341 (“[S]tudies linking 
physician age, cognitive function, and clinical 
performance have been limited by small sample size and 
use of historical case-control groups, were conducted 
among physicians selected because of poor clinical 
performance, and lacked a well-defined normative group. 
As a result, cognitive screening may not be applicable 
to all groups of aging physicians.”). 
108. Id. 
109. Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Systematic Review: The 
Relationship between Clinical Experience and Quality of 
Healthcare, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 260 (2005). 
110. See, e.g., Ralph B. Blasier, The Problem of the Aging 
Surgeon: When Surgeon Age Becomes A Surgical Risk 
Factor, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 402, 404 
(2009); Haddad, supra note 36, at 16; Bieliaskus et al., 
supra note 36, at 69; Elizabeth S. Grace et al., 
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measures such as compliance with evidence-based 
guidelines and medical knowledge. The study, 
however, did not address cognitive impairment. The 
researchers concluded that thirty-two of the studies 
(52 percent) showed an inverse relationship between 
“performance” and age or years in practice.111 
However, many of the studies with a negative age 
association grouped their cohorts in brackets such 
as “>10 years” or “>20 years in practice,”112 which 
would include physicians in their forties and 
fifties, respectively, or used an age between forty 
and fifty to divide physicians into two large 
groups.113 The age range of these cohort groups is 
too wide to justify screening for a particular 
narrow subset. Furthermore, as the article points 
out, several of the included studies did not present 
statistical tests.114 
Multiple other studies offered as support for the 
need for age-based screening are also not 
persuasive. Caulford et al.,115 for example, claimed 
 
Predictors of Physician Performance on Competence 
Assessment: Findings from CPEP, the Center for 
Personalized Education for Physicians, 89 ACAD. MED. 912, 
917 (2014); Christine Y. Moutier et al., Approaching the 
Issue of the Aging Physician Population, 99 J. MATERIALS 
RES. 10, 11 (2013). See also Steven E. Weinberger et al, 
“Practice Makes Perfect” . . . Or Does It?, 142 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 302 (2005) (the accompanying editorial to 
Choudhry et al.’s article, stating that the study 
highlights the need for physicians to stay current with 
changes in medicine). 
111. Choudhry et al., supra note 109, at 261. The Article’s 
conclusions are also sometimes misstated. See, e.g., 
Chanaka Wijeratne & Carmelle Peisah, Accepting the 
Challenges of Ageing And Retirement In Ourselves: The 
Need for Psychiatrists to Adopt a Consensus Approach, 47 
AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. PSYCHIATRY 425, 426 (2013) 
(incorrectly citing Choudhry et al.’s finding that “52%” 
of the studies reviewed showed an inverse relationship 
between age and performance as “73%”.). 
112. See Choudhry et al., supra note 109, at 266-68. 
113. See id. at 264-68. 
114. See id. at 264. 
115. Paul G. Caulford et al., Physician Incompetence: 
Specific Problems and Predictors, 69 ACAD. MED. 516 
(1994). 
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age was associated with dyscompetency116 but did not 
include any detail about the subjects’ ages or age 
range. Turnbull et al.’s 2000 study found seven of 
twenty-seven physicians in Ontario’s Physician 
Review Program (“PREP”) to have cognitive 
impairment.117 Of these, three were under sixty (ages 
forty-seven, forty-eight, and fifty-two), and four 
were sixty or above (ages sixty, sixty-one, sixty-
four, and sixty-five).118 In their 2006 study of 
forty-five PREP physicians referred for competency 
concerns, twelve physicians had evidence of 
cognitive impairment on an age-adjusted analysis, 
which increased to seventeen on an age-independent 
analysis.119 The authors specified 35-40 as the age 
range of the reference group for the age-independent 
analysis but did not state the age range or age 
distribution of the study cohort.120 Kataria et al.’s 
review of 109 physicians and dentists referred to 
the United Kingdom’s National Clinical Assessment 
Service for performance issues121 identified fourteen 
(13 percent) with cognitive impairment.122 Of these, 
the two youngest were in their forties, one was over 
seventy, and the authors did not discuss the age 
distribution of the remaining eleven.123 
A larger study at the Colorado Personalized 
Education for Physicians (“CPEP”) program124 
evaluated 683 physicians referred for evaluation by 
their state medical board or hospital. All underwent 
a cognitive screen, structured clinical interviews, 
simulated patient encounters, written tests, and 
 
116. Id. at 518. 
117. Turnbull, 2000, supra note 61, at 178. 
118. Id. at 179 (Table 1 contains a formatting error that was 
later corrected. The revised Table 1 is available from 
the corresponding author. See, Turnbull et al., supra 
note 17, at 915. The list of impaired subjects’ ages is 
based on the revised Table.). 
119. Turnbull et al., supra note 17, at 916. 
120. Id. at 916-17 (Table 2). 
121. See Kataria et al., supra note 61, at 1-2. 
122. Id. at 4 (Table 4). 
123. Id. at 4-5. 
124. Grace et al., supra note 110. 
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chart reviews.125 The study found 12.6 percent of the 
referred physicians unsafe to practice, requiring 
remediation in a residency program.126 The authors 
provided the average age (53.1) and age range (32-
84) of the 683 physicians without further 
stratification,127 except that the average age of the 
“unsafe” group was 5.1 years older than the group 
deemed safe to practice.128 Interestingly, the 
authors did not include any results related to the 
cognitive screenings they performed. 
Norman et al.129 reported on the first three years 
(1989-1992) of the PREP program. The researchers 
described how the College of Physician and Surgeons 
of Ontario (“CPSO”), the provincial licensing body, 
selected 450 of the province’s 17,000 physicians for 
peer review assessment.130 All physicians seventy 
years old or older received an assessment, but CPSO 
randomly selected the participants that were under 
age seventy. The study did not mention how many of 
the 450 physicians evaluated were seventy or older. 
Out of the 450, thirty-seven physicians underwent 
clinical competency testing due to either persistent 
patient care or record-keeping deficiencies or 
because they were under CPSO discipline.131 
Researchers compared the performance of this group 
with a non-age-matched younger reference group, 
leading to a not surprising difference in the mean 
age of the groups: 52.4 (SD+/-14.1) vs. 46.6 (SD+/-
11.5).132 The authors offered no further 
 
125. Id. at 913. 
126. Id. at 916. 
127. Id. at 914. 
128. Id. at 916. 
129. Norman et al., supra note 105, at 1047. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 1048. Assuming a normal distribution, 68% of the 
referral group was between the ages of 38 and 66, with 
another 16% younger than 38, and 16% who were older than 
66. For detailed discussions of the normal distribution, 
see DOUGLAS G. ALTMAN, PRACTICAL STATISTICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH 
54-57 (1999); Andy Kierz, Here’s What Nerds Mean When 
They Say ‘Standard Deviation’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec 2, 
2014). http://www.businessinsider.com/standard-
deviation-2014-12 (explaining that a standard deviation, 
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stratification of performance and age. Because older 
physicians were intentionally oversampled, the 
reference group was not age-matched, and the broad 
standard deviation suggests a wide age range of 
dyscompetent physicians, the study cannot 
demonstrate that late-career physicians are 
disproportionately responsible for dyscompetent 
practice. 
McAuley et al. studied 918 physicians who also 
received assessments by CPSO.133 The initial 
selection of physicians was random, but after the 
first two years, the program selected more 
physicians from the “older groups.”134 The physicians 
underwent review of randomly selected medical charts 
and an interview.135 The researchers found the 
following distribution of physicians with “grossly 
deficient records or unsatisfactory level of patient 
care or both”: 35 percent of physicians over the age 
of seventy-five, 16 percent of physicians between 
fifty and seventy-four; and 9 percent of physicians 
under age fifty.136 The study does raise concern 
about physicians over the age of seventy-five. 
However, the middle group with an age range of 50–
74 provides insufficient stratification to know if 
late-career physicians younger than seventy-five 
evidence more problematic care than mid-career 
physicians. Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, 
a 9 percent dyscompetency rate for the under-50 year 
old physician population suggests that such 
challenges apply to all physician age groups137 and 
 
or SD, is “a measure of how spread out a data set 
is . . . .68% of measurements of a normally distributed 
quantity should fall within one standard deviation of 
the mean, 95% of measurements within two standard 
deviations of the mean, and 99.7% within three standard 
deviations of the mean.”). 
133. Ronald G. McAuley et al., Five-Year Results of the Peer 
Assessment Program of the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Ontario, 43 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1193, 1193-
94 (1990). 
134. Id. at 1195. 
135. Id. at 1195. 
136. Id. at 1196 (Table 3). 
137. While there is no guarantee that the dyscompetency rates 
in Ontario correlate to those in the U.S., assuming they 
do suggests interesting results. The Federation of State 
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that a sole focus on late-career physicians is 
misguided. The study did not report cognitive status 
of the subjects, nor did it discuss reasons why 
dyscompetency would occur in more recently trained 
physicians. 
3. Non-Age-Related Sources of Impairment 
The impetus for age-based cognitive screening 
without demonstration of a convincing need stands 
in contrast to how little is said about well-
documented non-age-related factors associated with 
dyscompetency and impairment. Solo practice138 and 
lack of board certification,139 for example, are 
repeatedly identified as associated physician 
characteristics. In addition, a myriad of medical 
conditions affect physicians of all ages and could 
threaten patient safety. Specifically, researchers 
estimate physician impairment prevalence rates of 
up to 15 percent due to psychiatric illness, 
physical illness, alcoholism, and/or drug abuse.140 
 
Medical Board’s 2016 census (see Young, supra note 2, at 
11) divides U.S. physicians by decades. Using Ontario 
dyscompetency rates, if distribution groups are shifted 
to <50, 50-69, and 70+, results should favor the middle 
group and disfavor the oldest group. The exercise 
reveals the following: For the youngest group (n=415,234 
(49% of total licensed U.S. physicians)), a 9% rate 
yields 37,371 dyscompetent physicians. For the middle 
group (n=354,356 (42% of total)), a 16% rate yields 
56,697. For the oldest group (n=75,627 (9% of total)), 
a 35% rate yields 26,469. However, the absolute number 
in the oldest group would be lower because many no longer 
practice. Such estimates are relevant to determining how 
best to identify and address all risks to patient safety. 
138. See, e.g., Grace et al., supra note 110, at 915; Norman 
et al., supra note 105, at 1049; McAuley et al., supra 
note 133, at 1196 (Table 3). See also Elizabeth F. 
Wenghofer et al., Factors Affecting Physician 
Performance: Implications for Performance Improvement and 
Governance, 5 HEALTHCARE POL’Y 141, 151-52 (2009) (noting that 
insufficient organizational structures and systems 
likely contribute to the higher prevalence of 
dyscompetence among solo practitioners, especially in 
rural practices). 
139. See, e.g., Grace et al., supra note 110; Caulford et 
al., supra note 115, at S18. McAuley, supra note 133, 
at 1196. 
140. See, e.g., Eugene V. Boisaubin & Ruth E. Levine, 
Identifying and Assisting the Impaired Physician, 322 
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Adler and Constantinou report that the Medical 
Practitioners Board of Victoria (Australia) 
receives referrals for 1 percent of physicians from 
every age group.141 Older physicians account for a 
higher proportion of referrals for cognitive or 
other health concerns, while younger physician 
referrals are more often for substance abuse and 
psychiatric disorders.142 However, the authors also 
note that health and cognitive impairment concerns 
make up 50 percent of all referrals.143 Because only 
15.7 percent of Victoria’s physicians are sixty or 
older, it appears that a significant number of these 
latter types of concerns must involve younger 
physicians.144 
Alcohol and drug abuse remains a significant 
issue. Seven percent (7%) of physicians will 
struggle with alcoholism,145 and 18 percent abuse 
alcohol or drugs during their lifetime.146 Chronic 
alcohol use can cause cognitive dysfunction.147 Even 
medical students and residents, the newest members 
of the profession, are at risk for psychiatric or 
substance abuse issues that can be difficult to 
 
AM. J. MED. SCI. (2001) 31, 32 (noting estimated drug and 
alcohol abuse prevalence rates among physicians of 2-
14%); Steven L. Dubovsky et al., Do Data Obtained from 
Admissions Interviews and Resident Evaluations Predict 
Later Personal and Practice Problems?, 29 ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY 443, 443 (2005) (estimating an 8-15% 
prevalence rate of impairing illnesses among 
physicians); Laetitia L. Thompson, Neuropsychological 
Assessment of Physicians Whose Competency to Practice 
Medicine is Being Questioned, 373, 374, in CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND COST OUTCOME RESEARCH: A BEGINNING (George P. 
Prigatano & Neil H. Pliskin, eds., 2003) (noting that 
physical and mental conditions impair 7-10% of 
physicians). 
141. Robert G. Adler & Conn Constantinou, Knowing-or Not 
Knowing-When to Stop: Cognitive Decline in Ageing 
Doctor, 189 MED. J. AUSTL. 622, 623 (2008). 
142. Id. at 623. 
143. Id. 
144. Id.  
145. Thompson, supra note 140, at 375; B. Williams, supra 
note 62, at 186. 
146. Boisaubin & Levine, supra note 140, at 32. 
147. B. Williams, supra note 62, at 183. 
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identify through admissions interviews, 
performance, or faculty evaluations.148 In one 
report, department chairs, residency program 
directors and chief residents believed that 
emotional problems impaired 12 percent of their 
residents.149 In another study, program directors 
suspected that 1 percent of their residents were 
alcohol dependent; however, 12 percent of the 
residents provided answers to CAGE150 questions that 
met criteria for diagnosis or suspicion for 
alcoholism.151   
Alcohol and drug abuse is also commonly involved 
in medical board discipline.152 In one study, 42 
percent of offenses in discipline cases involved 
impairment, abuse, inappropriate prescribing, 
possession, and/or other drug-related charge.153 
 
148. Dubovsky et al., supra note 140, at 443. 
149. Id. 
150. Charles P. O’Brien, The CAGE Questionnaire for Detection 
of Alcoholism A Remarkably Useful but Simple Tool, 300 
JAMA 2054, 2054 (2008). (The CAGE screen asks four 
questions: Have you ever felt you needed to Cut down on 
your drinking? Have people Annoyed you by criticizing 
your drinking? Have you ever felt Guilty about drinking? 
Have you ever felt you needed a drink first thing in the 
morning (Eye-opener) to steady your nerves or to get rid 
of a hangover?). 
151. Robert M. McNamara & Jeffrey L. Margulies, Chemical 
Dependency in Emergency Medicine Residency Programs: 
Perspective of the Program Directors, 23 ANNALS EMERGENCY 
MED. 1072, 1074 (1994); Rebecca S. Feinberg, The Impaired 
Physician: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Analysis with a 
Policy Recommendation, 34 NOVA L. REV. 595, 627 (2010) 
(“the majority of physician impairment starts during 
medical school”). 
152. See Steven W. Clay & Robert R. Conatser, Characteristics 
of Physicians Disciplined by the State Medical Board of 
Ohio, 103 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 81, 85 (Table 3) (2003) 
(finding that drug and alcohol abuse was the most common 
reason for discipline in Ohio (21%) and the third most 
common reason in California); Mark P. McGovern et al., 
Characteristics of Physicians Presenting for Assessment 
at a Behavioral Health Center, 19 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 59, 
64 (2000) (noting that referrals originate from medical 
societies, hospitals/partners, and licensing 
authorities). 
153. Clay & Conatser, supra note 152, at 85. 
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Compared to non-disciplined control groups,154 these 
disciplined physicians were more likely to be male,155 
in practice for less than twenty years,156 and not 
board-certified.157 
Failure to recognize non-age-related sources of 
dyscompetency and impairment obscures the need to 
monitor and intervene with younger members of the 
profession. In one assessment site, 108 physicians 
with a mean age of forty-six158 (the youngest 
participants were “<35” and the oldest “>55”159) 
typically had at least five years of substance abuse 
with “disruptions in emotional, work, and 
relationship functioning” prior to their referral.160 
Yet it appears that those who worked most closely 
with these physicians either failed to identify or 
failed to act despite ongoing interaction, for only 
20 percent of referrals to the assessment program 
came directly from the physicians’ hospitals and 
practice partners.161 
Thus, if a program is to identify at-risk 
physicians, it must look beyond the single 
demographic of late-career physicians in light of 
evidence that most late-career physicians practice 
safely, and that in all physician age groups there 
are colleagues who need intervention.162 The point 
is not, however, to implement screenings on more 
physicians, but rather to consider methodologies 
 
154. Id. at 82 (stating that one control group was matched 
for location only and the other control group was matched 
for location, practice type, specialty, and gender.). 
155. Id. at 83. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. McGovern et. al., supra note 152, at 62. 
159. Id. at 63 (Table 1). 
160. Id. at 69. 
161. Id. at 64. 
162. Kupfer, supra note 18, at 341-42. (“Taking physician age 
as the sole criterion for assessment could well limit 
how significantly competency assessment programs can 
improve patient safety and quality.”). 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
124 
that can monitor for and detect performance issues 
across the entirety of a physician’s career.163 
II.  Justifying the Burdens and Costs of Age-
Based Cognitive Screening 
In addition to the lack of evidence to justify 
cognitive screening of every physician above a 
certain age, any strategy that wastes resources and 
results in unacceptable levels of misdetection would 
be of concern.164 The severity of excessive scrutiny 
and misdetection would depend on the screening 
mechanisms used. While less obtrusive and more 
accurate screening mechanisms may diminish 
excessive burdens and false positives, they do not 
eliminate the problem.165 Furthermore, false negative 
results among the screened group166 and the failure 
to detect significant dysfunctionality among 
physicians not targeted for increased scrutiny—
those who are younger than the age cut-off for 
screening—are of equal concern because they result 
in less safe patient care. 
For these reasons, it is important to examine any 
age-based screening program for anticipated costs, 
potential benefits and harms,167 and cost-
effectiveness.168 In particular, those who advocate 
for screening must have sufficient understanding of 
 
163. See infra Part IV. 
164. See David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Uses and Abuses 
of Screening Tests, 359 THE LANCET 881 (2002). 
165. Developing Microcog norms that result in higher 
sensitivity for identifying physicians with cognitive 
challenges are also less specific and likely to create 
more false positives. Individuals with false positives 
would need to undergo extensive further testing to 
differentiate false from true. See Williams et al., 
Assessment of Fitness, supra note 67, at 10. 
166. Id. at 9. 
167. See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 164, at 881-82. 
168. See Le Couteur, supra note 27, at 1; Grimes & Schulz, 
supra note 164, at 882; James M. G. Wilson & Guntner 
Jungner, The Principles and Practice of Screening for 
Disease, GENEVA: WORLD HEALTH ORG. (1968) (the Wilson and 
Jungner criteria for screening programs are considered 
the “gold standard.”). 
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the limitations of the testing methods.169 Currently, 
there is a lack of consensus on a screening 
instrument validated for physicians.170 Cognitive 
testing tools are not normed for highly educated 
individuals like physicians171 who tend to have 
higher baselines and perform significantly better 
than their age peers in the general population.172 
Furthermore, the demonstrated value of 
neuropsychological testing is in settings where the 
clinician already suspects the patient is 
 
169. See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 164, at 882-83. 
170. See Dorene M. Rentz et al., Use of IQ-Adjusted Norms to 
Predict Progressive Cognitive Decline in Highly 
Intelligent Older Individuals, 18 NEUROBIOLOGY 38, 45 
(2004) (showing IQ-adjusted norms may be a better 
estimate of decline than norms for age and education). 
But see, Page, supra note 3 (“Doris Gundersen, 
MD . . . president of the Federation of State Physician 
Health Programs and medical director of the Colorado 
physician health program, agrees that ‘no cognitive 
screening tests that I’m aware of have been validated 
specifically for the physician population . . . ’”). 
171. See Thompson, supra note 140, at 385; B. Williams et 
al., supra note 67, at 6 (“[T]he Norm sample for the 
Microcog does not effectively represent the pilots or 
the physician samples.”); Laurel Sample et al., 
Comparing Patient-Management Skills of Referred 
Physicians and Non-Referred Physicians on a Computer-
Based Case-Simulation Examination, 76 ACAD. MED. 524, 
524-25 (2001).  
172. See Powell, supra, note 19, at 71 (“ . . . in the two 
decades after 60, the Normal women and men scored in 
about the same range as physicians ten years older.”); 
Jennifer S. Lin et al., Screening for Cognitive 
Impairment in Older Adults: A Systematic Review for the 
U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
601, 604 (Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing findings from meta-
analysis of studies related to cognitive screening: when 
education was reported, subjects “usually had at least 
some high school education;” most screening instruments 
were involved in only one study; 9 instruments subjected 
to more than one study showed “limited reproducibility 
in primary care–relevant populations and unknown optimum 
cut points for each instrument;” and the six instruments 
involved in more than one study showed lower sensitivity 
for diagnosing MCI than dementia.). 
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cognitively impaired and needs more information,173 
is assessing the functional status of a patient 
already diagnosed with cognitive impairment,174 and 
is helping with future planning.175 Thus, as 
physician normative data are developed,176 a more 
appropriate role would be to test physicians, 
regardless of age,177 where there is evidence, such 
as underperformance, to support the need rather than 
to test physicians who do not demonstrate 
difficulties.178 
Another challenge with cognitive screening is 
that healthcare organizations would have difficulty 
knowing what to do with the information. Not only 
is it unclear how quality of care and patient 
outcomes correlate to testing results,179 there is 
also no consensus on how to determine what level of 
impairment is sufficient to warrant removal from 
practice.180 Because mean scores continue to decline 
 
173. Latha Velayudhan et al., Review of Brief Cognitive Tests 
for Patients with Suspected Dementia., 26 INT’L 
PSYCHOGERIATRICS 1247, 1256-57 (2014). 
174. See Thompson, supra note 140, at 379-80. 
175. Kathleen A. Welsh-Bohmer et al., The Clinical Utility of 
Neuropsychological Evaluation of Patients with Known or 
Suspected Dementia, in CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND COST OUTCOME 
RESEARCH: A BEGINNING 177, 182 (George P. Prigatano & Neil 
H. Pliskin, eds., 2003). 
176. B. Williams et al., supra note 67, at 8 (authors estimate 
that 90% of physicians with cognitive dysfunction may be 
missed by the Microcog using general population norms). 
177. Id. The authors discuss the case of a 54-year-old 
physician who was experiencing difficulties with 
behavior and interpersonal communication. Using 
experimental norms based on meta-analysis of two small 
physician samples, they identified neurocognitive 
abnormalities in this physician missed by the general 
Microcog norms. The authors also emphasize that their 
meta-analysis may not apply to a “true population sample 
of physicians” (Id. at 9.), and more data are needed 
(Id. at 10). 
178. Id. at 2. 
179. See Blasier, supra note 110, at 405 (stating that “there 
has not been any showing that a good score on the 
MicroCog correlates with good performance of surgery or 
that a low score on the MicroCog correlates with 
incompetency or lack of skill.”). 
180. Adler & Constantinou, supra note 141, at 623. 
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after age fifty,181 screening creates risk that 
organizations might take action on physicians with 
declining scores even with satisfactory clinical 
performance. 
Some of the information necessary to determine 
the potential usefulness and economic and non-
economic costs of a cognitive screening program is 
not yet known. This information includes the 
prevalence of the screened-for condition within the 
physician population,182 anticipated frequency of 
testing, number of screenings required to yield one 
positive result, frequency of false positive and 
false negative results,183 cost of administering the 
tests, and estimated numbers and costs of 
confirmatory neuropsychological evaluations.184 
Costs should be weighed against countervailing 
individual and societal costs should testing not 
occur and any potential benefits that could accrue 
from testing.185 A decision to test should also take 
into account the economic and emotional burdens 
imposed on screened physicians.186 Moreover, the 
hospital needs to determine in advance whether the 
physician, the hospital, or another entity would bear 
the costs of screening. Consider also that any 
decision to screen non-discriminatorily and include 
younger physicians who, as demonstrated in Part 
I(C), may also manifest cognitive impairment,187 
would amplify all costs. 
Finally, cost estimates for case finding require 
cost comparisons with other modalities for 
identifying physicians with cognitive impairment, 
including each modality’s false positive and false 
 
181. See Thompson, supra note 140, at 390; Powell, supra note 
19, at 70. 
182. Grimes & Schulz, supra note 164, at 883 (“Clinicians 
must know the approximate prevalence of the condition of 
interest in the population being test tested; if not, 
reasonable interpretation is impossible.”). 
183. Id. at 882. 
184. Id. at 883. 
185. Id. at 881. 
186. Le Couteur, supra note 27, at 3. See also, Grimes & Schulz, 
supra note 164, at 881. 
187. See e.g., Kataria et al., supra note 61, at 4-5. 
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negative rates. If ubiquitous performance 
surveillance, for example, reliably detects 
performance or behavioral issues, the balance 
potentially tilts sharply towards assessment of the 
individual physician irrespective of age. 
III. The Illegality of Age-Based Cognitive 
Screening Programs for Physicians 
Apart from the pragmatic problems described, 
aged-based screening for older physicians is of 
questionable legality. A strong likelihood exists 
that both the ADEA188 and the ADA prohibit testing 
of this sort.189 Before proceeding, it is worth 
noting that both of these laws, and the closely 
associated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,190 protect people who fall into the category 
of ‘employee’. Because of the way the medical 
profession is structured, questions will often arise 
about whether a particular physician is a covered 
employee within the meaning of the statute. This 
discussion will begin by assuming that no such 
question is present. In terms of the profession, it 
will assume that the healthcare organization is 
endeavoring to test its own employees. The subparts 
of this section will consider treatment of age-based 
screening under the ADEA and the ADA, and then 
consider separately the situation where a physician 
has hospital privileges but is employed by a 
different legal entity. 
A. Age-Related Cognitive Screening Violates the ADEA 
1. The ADEA Prohibits Disparate Treatment on the 
Basis of Age 
The ADEA protects workers forty or older191 and 
forbids employers from discriminating against them 
on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623 states, inter 
alia, that: 
 
188. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. 
189. Americans with Disabilities Act as Amended § 126, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2009). 
190. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352) (Title VII), 
as amended, SEC. 2000e-2 (2). 
191. 29 U.S.C § 621 et seq. 
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It shall be unlawful for an employer - 
(1) . . . to discharge . . . or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment,because of such 
individual’s age; (2) to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s age.192 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the ADEA 
tracks Title VII.193 Title VII forbids discrimination 
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”194 Three years after its passage, Congress 
enacted the ADEA to prohibit discrimination based 
on age. In some sense, the ADEA is a follow-up to 
Title VII. To be sure, Title VII addresses issues 
that represent the most serious of the nation’s 
normative dilemmas.195 Although age discrimination 
does not have the same historical significance in 
 
192. 29 U.S.C. § 623. 
193. See Transworld Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 
121(1985). The later Gross decision distinguishes 
between the two statutes regarding the standard of 
proof, but does not question their substantive 
similarity regarding the nature of discrimination. 
194. See Griggs v. Duke Power Company 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
(“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title 
VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers 
that . . . favor . . . white employees over other 
employees . . . practices, procedures, or tests neutral 
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices . . . artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible 
classifications.”). 
195. See, ELIJAH ANDERSON AND DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, eds., PROBLEM OF THE 
CENTURY: RACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2001) 
(comprising essays on the centrality of race in 20th 
century U.S.); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST 
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1989). 
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our nation as racial discrimination,196 the two 
statutes are clearly allied with each other in 
policy terms. As the Supreme Court declared, 
“[t]here are important similarities between the two 
statutes, to be sure, both in their aims—the 
elimination of discrimination from the workplace—
and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the 
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba 
from Title VII.”197 
This parallelism between the ADEA and Title VII 
is instructive. There would not be any doubt that 
an employer violated Title VII if it required 
employees of one gender to take a special skills 
competency test, audited financial transactions 
only for its salespersons of one faith, or 
administered a substance abuse test exclusively to 
employees of one race. Singling out a group of 
physicians by a protected trait, age, likewise 
constitutes disparate treatment. It is 
discriminatory because it relies for its rationale 
on a stereotype that older physicians are prone to 
cognitive impairment. The precise purpose of 
antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII or the 
ADEA is to eliminate generalizations of this sort. 
 
196. Judicial interpretation of Title VII and the ADEA 
reflect the relative sensitivities. See e.g., Jacqueline 
Go, Another Move Away from Title VII: Why Gross Got It 
Right, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1025, 1048-49 (2011); see 
also, Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. Gardner, 
Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 38 J. SOCIOLOGY 
& SOCIAL WORK 9, 19, 23 (2011). 
197. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (This 
statement applied to the substantive provisions of the 
two laws, and follows the whole code canon of statutory 
interpretation). See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining 
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859, 874 (“statutory 
terms should bear consistent meaning across the U.S. 
Code as a whole.”). Gross has been criticized for its 
divergence from Title VII interpretation. See, e.g., 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and 
the Significance of Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEXAS 
L. REV. 157, 161 (2012) citing Martin J. Katz, Gross 
Disunity, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 857, 871 (2010) (“[Gross] 
rejected a perfectly reasonable and widely applied canon 
of construction—the presumption of uniformity—with no 
good reason for doing so.”) 
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In Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,198 
the Court found that the employer violated Title VII 
and unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex 
when the employer justified collecting higher 
pension contributions from female employees on the 
grounds that women live longer.199 The Court reasoned 
that characteristics of an individual woman and an 
individual man are not the same as characteristics 
of the “average” representative within the class of 
“women” or “men” because other factors affect 
longevity other than sex.200 
Manhart’s rationale applies to older physicians. 
That the average trend is for humans to show 
cognitive decline over time does not justify using 
age as a trigger to test for cognitive impairment. 
Similar to Manhart, the inter-individual 
variability201 in cognitive function among physicians 
renders discriminatory policies that subject all 
late-career physicians to screening on the basis of 
generalizations. Furthermore, as Part I of this 
Article demonstrates, most late-career physicians 
perform well and some young physicians have evidence 
of cognitive or other impairment. 
2. Age-Related Testing Constitutes Disparate 
Treatment 
Age-related cognitive screening policies impose 
two conditions of employment on late career 
physicians to which younger physicians are not 
subject. First, only older physicians are required 
to undergo screening, and second, the organization 
forcibly separates those who refuse screening.202 No 
younger physicians are placed in this position. 
 
198. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power v. 
Manhart, 98 U.S. 1370, 1374 (1978). 
199. Id. at 1379. 
200. Id. at 1377. 
201. For a discussion on intra-group variability, see supra 
text and accompanying notes 23-25. 
202. See, e.g., Sanford, supra note 3; CPPPH, supra note 88, 
at 7 (stating in its model guidelines for implementing 
age-based screening that the policy should “specify the 
consequences to the practitioner of failure to comply 
with all the requests during the assessment process or 
failure to complete the assessment process, i.e., such 
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Age-related cognitive screening policies also 
classify physicians in ways that are far from 
benign. Such classification readily constitutes the 
type of action that the ADEA prohibits. In EEOC v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,203 the EEOC brought 
suit arguing that the state violated the ADEA when 
it required annual medical examinations for all 
employees who reached seventy years of age.204 Citing 
Western Airlines v. Criswell,205 the court agreed, 
pointing out that “[t]he entire point of the ADEA 
statute is to force employers to abandon previous 
stereotypes about the abilities and capacities of 
older workers. Employers . . . may no longer 
immediately turn to age as a convenient, simple 
criterion.”206 
Of course, employers may make business decisions 
that burden their entire workforce. There is 
generally nothing illegal about implementing 
measures for all employees to ensure that they are 
competent, honest, and sober. An employer can also 
justifiably discharge an employee who performs 
incompetently, steals money, or abuses drugs, but 
only if monitoring measures are applied on an equal 
basis. When some particular burden is imposed on a 
protected group, however, the features of that burden 
become legally relevant and constitute discriminatory 
treatment. 
In justifying cognitive screening for older 
physicians, the hospital might argue that the burden 
of undergoing testing, essentially the 
inconvenience of giving up part of a workday, is 
minimal. However, given the asserted premise for the 
testing, which is that cognitive ability 
deteriorates progressively as a person ages, an 
employer would need to re-screen regularly to 
satisfy its own rationale. By itself, this sort of 
regular testing is burdensome. Classifying 
physicians in this way also affects or tends to 
 
failure will result in an incomplete application and 
lapse of privileges”). 
203. EEOC v. Com. of Mass., 987 F.2d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 1993). 
204. Id. at 66. 
205. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 410 (1985). 
206. EEOC v. Com. of Mass., 987 F.2d, at 71. 
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affect a physician’s reputational status.207 By 
virtue of its explicitly established policy, the 
organization declares certain medical staff a 
potential safety threat. For experienced physicians 
who oversee trainees, consult with colleagues, and 
wish to inspire confidence in patients and staff 
alike, the result is likely embarrassment at best, 
and at worst potentially damaging to their ability 
to fulfill their roles. 
Moreover, beyond the burdens and emotional 
implications of being subject to the testing, the 
testing itself has other significant consequences 
for the physicians. As seen in Part II, there is no 
simple and reliable screening test for highly 
educated and experienced individuals, and false 
positive and false negative tests will occur. 
Certainly, inaccuracies plague all instruments and 
methodologies. However, taking adverse employment 
actions that would deprive or have the effect of 
depriving individuals from employment opportunities—
such as threatening or restricting clinical 
privileges, even if temporary, based on an 
unreliable cognitive screen—violates the ADEA. In 
such a case, the plaintiff-employee could readily 
demonstrate that if not for the employer’s use of 
age as an explicit basis for testing, the employer 
would not have subjected the employee to further 
adverse employment action. 
Although perhaps somewhat counterintuitive, even 
the accurate detection of cognitive impairment among 
older physicians tested en masse would likely 
violate the ADEA because the testing would not 
include the non-targeted physicians. There is no 
convincing evidence that older physicians suffer 
from cognitive impairment at a high rate, and 
impairing conditions are found in physicians of any 
age. Therefore, taking action like restricting 
privileges against members of one group without 
taking the same action against others who are 
similarly situated is unlawful discrimination. The 
ADEA requires that the employer’s actions do not 
single out this protected group, older physicians, 
for increased scrutiny. 
 
207. 29 U.S.C § 623 (a)(2)(2017). 
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3. Employers Cannot Assert Any Valid Defense 
Employers might assert four types of exceptions 
to an ADEA claim208: first, that performing cognitive 
screening on older physicians does not rise to the 
level of disparate treatment; second, that the 
employer based its actions on a “reasonable factor 
other than age” or “RFOA”209; third, that a trait is 
a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”)210; 
or fourth, that one of the ADEA’s occupational 
exceptions applies.211 
a. The Defense that Age-Based Screening is not 
Disparate Treatment is Invalid 
Through judicial interpretation, courts have 
established significant hurdles for the plaintiff-
employee to overcome to prevail on disparate 
treatment claims under the ADEA. In Hazen Paper Co. 
v. Biggins,212 the U.S. Supreme Court required that 
the plaintiff demonstrate that the employer 
intentionally acted because of the employee’s age.213 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services,214 the Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Thomas, imposed an even higher 
standard for the plaintiff, holding that “a 
plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ 
cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”215 Thus, 
 
208. See 29 U.S.C. 623 (f)(1) (2017). 
209. 29 U.S.C. 623 (f)(1) (2017). 
210. Id. 
211. 29 U.S.C. 623(j) (2017). 
212. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). 
213. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 617. See also Kentucky Retirement 
Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 136, 147-48 (2008) (holding 
that discharge of an employee due to his pension status 
does not, by itself, constitute a violation of the ADEA 
because pension benefits and age are analytically 
distinct); Joseph A. Seinert, Disentangling Disparate 
Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian 
Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 90, 96 (2006). 
214. Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167 
(2009). 
215. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (In reaching this conclusion, 
Justice Thomas relied on the ordinary language analysis, 
replete with dictionary citations that the current Court 
favors so heavily. He said: “The ordinary meaning of the 
ADEA’s requirement that an employer took adverse action 
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the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff who 
must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the employer acted solely on the 
basis of the employee’s age.216 A jury might find 
that causation, for example, when the employer 
expressed a preference for younger employees,217 a 
desire for a different style of performance,218 a 
concern that the employee has “been there too 
long,”219 or a query that “you’re 64, how much longer 
are you going to work.”220 If the plaintiff cannot 
prove age as the “but-for” reason for the employment 
action, Gross disallows recovery even if the 
employer had “mixed motives” because the holding 
eliminates any need for the defendant to show she 
would have taken the action against the employee 
regardless of his age.221 
While Gross increases the difficulty for a 
plaintiff to prevail in a disparate treatment ADEA 
 
‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the 
employer decided to act.”). 
216. Id. 
217. Scheick v. Tecumseh Public Schools 766 F.3d 523, 531-
532 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[S]tatements about wanting ‘someone 
younger’ are not ambi-guous . . . [Plaintiff] presented 
evidence, which, if believed, would require the 
conclusion that age was the but-for cause of TPS’s 
decision not to renew the contract.”). See also General 
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 
(2004) (ADEA does not prevent an employer from favoring 
an older employee over a relatively younger one). 
218. U.S. EEOC v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F. 2d 1446, 
1450 (7th Cir. 1992). 
219. Schindler v. Bierwith Chrysler/Plymouth Inc., 15 F. 
Supp. 2d 1054, 1056 (D. Kan. 1998). 
220. Smith v. Chester County Bd. Of Educ. 218 F.Supp.3d 619, 
625, 630 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (“[R]emark 
during . . . interview, which Plaintiff recounts as 
“you’re 64, how much longer are you going to work,” 
constitutes direct evidence of age 
discrimination . . . a reasonable jury could find that 
age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment 
action . . . .”). 
221. “The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer 
to show that it would have taken the action regardless 
of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence 
that age was one motivating factor in that decision.” 
557 U.S. at 180. 
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claim,222 it does not make an age-based cognitive 
testing program any more permissible. Age is clearly 
the “but-for” reason for the testing. If there were 
some other basis for administering the test, then 
some physicians above the screening age would not 
be tested and some physicians below that age would 
be. Thus, even according to the Supreme Court’s 
demanding standards for disparate treatment ADEA 
actions, age-based screening violates the Act.223 
b. The Reasonable Factor Other than Age (RFOA) 
Defense is Unavailable 
Employers might assert that screening older 
physicians for cognitive impairment is based on an 
RFOA.224 However, the ADEA demands225 that the 
employer’s RFOA is an accurately defined non-age 
factor that the employer applies “fairly and 
accurately.”226 Further, the employer must assess the 
adverse impact of the practice on older workers and 
take steps to reduce that harm.227 
 
222. William R. Corbett. Babbling About Employment 
Discrimination Law: Does The Master Builder Understand 
The Blueprint For The Great Tower?, 12 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 683, 728-29 (2010) (arguing that after Gross, which 
diverged from the long lines of cases interpreting the 
ADEA consistent with Title VII, Congress needs to 
clarify the law). 
223. Congress amended Title VII to overrule the Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989), (see Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 2000e–2(m) and 
2000e–5(g)(2)(B)), but did not amend the ADEA along the 
same lines. This does not alter the Court’s conclusion 
that the substantive language of both statutes is 
equivalent. 
224. 29 C.F.R. 1625.7; See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power 
Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84, 87 (2008) (holding that the 
RFOA defense is an affirmative one, for which employers 
bear the burdens of production and persuasion.). 
225. See Stephen D. Erf, New EEOC Rule Significantly 
Increases Employer Burdens in ADEA Disparate Impact 
Cases, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (May 29, 2012), 
https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publicat
ions/2012/05/new-eeoc-rule-significantly-increases-
employer-b__ . 
226. 29 C.F.R. 1625.7 (e)(2)(ii). 
227. 29 C.F.R. 1625.7 (2) (iv-v). 
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The defendant-employer would likely claim that 
given its legitimate business interest to provide 
safe patient care, a screening program based on the 
RFOA of needing to assure that its physicians are 
not cognitively impaired is reasonably related to 
safe care.228 The problem for the hospital is that 
if it is justified in searching for physicians who 
pose risk to patients because of cognitive 
impairment, then the law demands that it also search 
for any physician who poses similar risk—not just 
those in their late career. 
Furthermore, an employer who fires a physician 
who refuses to undergo testing has not seriously 
considered the adverse impact of the testing 
practice on older workers nor has taken any steps 
to reduce that harm. It is one thing for a hospital 
to have a policy that removes a physician who 
refuses to submit to assessment when the reason for 
the mandated assessment is evidence of a problem. 
It is another thing to administer a draconian 
penalty in the absence of such evidence. Finally, 
if the employer uses age as the limiting criterion 
for the practice, as in this case where there is an 
established age in the policy when screening will 
begin, the RFOA exception to the ADEA would not be 
available to the employer.229 
c. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) 
Defense is Unavailable 
Given that cognitive testing falls within the 
category of prohibited disadvantages that may not 
be imposed on an age-related basis, the employer may 
justify it by claiming that intact cognitive skills 
are a bona fide occupational qualification (or 
“BFOQ”) for the physicians it employs. The statutory 
test for a BFOQ under the ADEA is whether it is 
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
 
228. See Ninth Circuit Jury Instruction Committee, 11.11 Age 
Discrimination – Defenses – Reasonable Factor other than 
Age, in MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT (last updated Mar. 2018). 
229. 29 C.F.R. 1625.7 (b) (“When an employment practice uses 
age as a limiting criterion, the defense that the 
practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than 
age is unavailable.”). 
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particular business.”230 Courts uniformly hold that 
this exception to the ADEA’s general prohibition of 
age discrimination is “extremely narrow.”231 The 
leading articulation of this narrow construction was 
by the Fifth Circuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail 
Tours, Inc..232 In considering whether a bus-tour 
company could refuse employment applications from 
individuals over the age of 40, the Fifth Circuit 
used a two-prong test to determine if the BFOQ 
defense applied to the employer’s assertion of 
public safety as its BFOQ.233 First, “the job 
qualifications which the employer invokes to justify 
his discrimination must be reasonably necessary to 
 
230. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2016) (“It shall not be unlawful for 
an employer, employment agency, or labor organization- 
       (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under 
subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where 
age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular 
business.”). 
231. See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 
412 (1985) (“[L]ike its Title VII counterpart, the BFOQ 
exception ‘was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow 
exception to the general prohibition’ of age 
discrimination contained in the ADEA.”) (quoting Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), a Title VII case that 
first construed the BFOQ exception); Gately v. Com. of 
Mass., 2 F.2d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
511 U.S. 1082 (1994) (holding that this clause is “‘an 
extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of 
age discrimination contained in the ADEA.”) (quoting 
Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 427 U.S. 400 (1985)); 
Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep’t, 697 F. 2d 743, 
748 (7th Cir., 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) 
(“[ . . . ]the courts have consistently held that the 
BFOQ exception to the ADEA is to be interpreted 
narrowly[ . . . ]”); Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 
661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir., 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 
1007 (1982) (“This exception is to be narrowly 
applied.”); Camacho v. Puerto Rico Port Auth., 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 220, 229 (D. Puerto Rico, 2003), rev’d, 369 
F.3d 570 (1st Cir. P.R. 2004)(“[T]he BFOQ defense is 
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the ADEA’s 
general prohibition.”). 
232. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 227 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
233. Id. at 235-36. 
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the essence of his business.”234 Second, the 
defendant must show either that (a) it had 
reasonable cause to believe that all or 
substantially all older employees were not 
qualified235 or (b) that it was impossible or 
impractical to individually ascertain the presence 
of a disqualifying trait.236 
The Supreme Court adopted this two-prong test in 
Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell.237 In 1992, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
which was charged with implementing the ADEA, 
incorporated this test into its regulations, along 
with an instruction that the BFOQ exception “must 
be narrowly construed.”238 The EEOC regulations made 
clear that, “[i]f the employer’s objective in 
asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the 
employer must prove that the challenged practice 
does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is 
no acceptable alternative which would better advance 
or equally advance it with less discriminatory 
impact.”239 
The two-prong analysis is readily applied to the 
case in which a healthcare organization wants to 
screen all of its older physicians for cognitive 
impairment. Because defects in neurocognitive 
functioning can impact the ability to practice 
medicine safely, no one would disagree that 
requiring physicians to be cognitively competent is 
a job qualification reasonably necessary to the 
healthcare business. The first prong for a BFOQ 
defense is therefore satisfied. 
The second prong of the test for using a BFOQ 
defense, however, is not met. Testing proponents 
 
234. Id. at 230. 
235. The defendant in Usery, for example, would have had to 
show that substantially all older drivers have traits 
that would interfere with safety and efficiency. Id. at 
235-37. 
236. Id. at 228. 
237. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 417-418 
(1985) (stating that the employer asserted public 
safety as its BFOQ). 
238. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (2017). 
239. Id. (emphasis added). 
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cannot demonstrate that age represents a proxy for 
a valid safety-related job qualification because 
they cannot make a factual finding that all or 
substantially all of those who are above a defined 
age limit have a trait that threatens safety. As 
seen, many older physicians choose not to retire and 
continue to do well in practice. Furthermore, 
claiming a BFOQ to screen all physicians above a 
certain age is self-refuting, because such a program 
rests on the premise that individualized assessment 
is neither impossible nor impractical. 
Thus, to avoid the ADEA’s prohibition against age 
discrimination and satisfy its own standards for 
precaution, the healthcare employer would need to 
have options in place other than age-based testing. 
One option would be to administer cognitive 
screening to all of its physician employees.240 
Should the employer not wish to do so, the employer 
should explore other methodologies to monitor all 
physicians for safe performance.241 
 
d. Analogy to Statutory Exceptions for Public Safety 
Officers and Airline Pilots is Inapplicable 
Certain groups of employees are expressly 
excluded from relevant parts of ADEA coverage, 
either by provisions of the ADEA (e.g., firefighters 
and law enforcement officers)242 or by other federal 
 
240. See EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep’t, 860 F.2d 665, 
667 (6th Cir., 1988) (holding cardiovascular fitness 
cannot be regarded as a valid reason for mandatory 
retirement age because the police department does not 
test officers below that age for this condition); EEOC 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 395 (3rd 
Cir., 1987) (finding that good health and physical 
conditioning cannot be a valid reason for mandatory 
retirement age if the police department has failed to 
develop minimum fitness standards). 
241. See infra Part IV. 
242. 29 U.S.C 623(j)(2012) (providing that, with respect to 
firefighters and law enforcement officers, states may 
“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
because of such individual’s age . . . [T]he employer 
has complied with section 3(d)(2) of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1996 if the 
individual was discharged after the date described in 
such section, and the individual has attained . . . the 
higher of . . . the age of retirement in effect on the 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
141 
statutes and regulations (e.g., commercial airline 
pilots and air traffic controllers).243 Because 
physicians are responsible for the health, and 
sometimes life or death, of their patients, some 
compare physicians to professionals like pilots who 
are excluded from the ADEA’s protections.244 However, 
this argument is unconvincing for exempting 
physicians from the ADEA.  
By its terms, the ADEA permits age-based hiring 
and discharge of “an individual employed as a 
firefighter or as a law enforcement officer.” 245 The 
original ADEA was amended in 1974 to cover federal, 
state and local governments.246 When it was amended 
again to prohibit mandatory retirement based on age, 
it made an exception for public employees deemed 
responsible for public safety, namely police and 
 
date of such discharge under such law; and . . . age 
55.”); see also, Special Retirement Provisions for Law 
Enforcement Officers, Firefighters and Air Traffic 
Controllers: A Guide for Human Resources Specialists, 
Benefits and Entitlements Branch, DEFENSE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE 1, 4, 14, 20 (2006) (“The legislative 
intent behind the special retirement provisions for LEOs 
and FFs was to provide for their early retirement based 
on a determination that these positions should be 
composed . . . of young men and women physically capable 
of meeting the vigorous demands of occupations that are 
more physically taxing than most in the Federal 
service.”) 
243. 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (a) (2017) (“a pilot may serve in 
multicrew covered operations until attaining 65 years of 
age”); 5 U.S.C. § 8335(a) (providing that the mandatory 
retirement age for air traffic controllers is 56). See 
also JODY FEDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW(2010), at 
3-4. 
244. The medical literature addressing the issue of age-based 
screening for physicians repeatedly raises a comparison 
between pilots and physicians. See, e.g., Haddad, supra 
note 35, at 16; Blasier, supra note 110, at 407; 
LoboPrabbu, supra note 6, at 446; E. Patchen Dellinger 
et al., The Aging Physician and the Medical Profession, 
152 JAMA SURGERY 967, 968 (2017). 
245. 29 U.S.C 623(j) (1996). 
246. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-259, §§ 28(a)(2-3),(b)(2)(codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 630(b), 633(a)). 
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firefighters.247 In doing so, Congress charged the 
EEOC with investigating what measurements could 
determine the physical and mental fitness of public 
safety officers so that individualized assessments 
could be implemented later.248 The EEOC commissioned 
Penn State University’s Center for Applied 
Behavioral Sciences249 to explore whether mandatory 
retirement ages for public safety jobs were 
justified.250 The study group concluded that age was 
not a predictor of job performance, and neither the 
Penn State researchers nor the EEOC could determine 
what tests would validate fitness of public safety 
officers.251 Therefore, the public safety exception 
to the ADEA remains a self-contained statutory 
provision252 with no underlying principle that can 
 
247. 29 U.S.C. § 631(j) (1988). 
248. Ron Edwards, Mandatory Retirement: Police, Fire Fighter 
and Tenured Faculty, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 404, 404 (1993). 
249. Id. See also, Martin Schiff, The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act: Whither the Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification and Law Enforcement Exemption?, 67 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 13, 16-17 (1993). 
250. Edwards, supra note 248. 
251. See Center for Applied Behavioral Sciences, Penn State 
University, Alternatives To Chronological Age In 
Determining Standards Of Suitability For Public Safety 
Jobs: Executive Summary Of Medical Section, 8-18 
(1992); see also Cheryl Anthony Epps, Legislative 
Alert: Penn State Study Recommends Elimination of ADEA 
Public Safety Exception, POLICE CHIEF 14, 14 (May 1992) 
(providing a detailed analysis of the study). 
252. After the ADEA was amended to extend to federal, state, 
and local governments, Fair Labor Standards Amendments 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 28(4) and 14(a), 88 Stat. 
74-5 (1974), it was further amended to exclude police 
officers and firefighters from certain portions of its 
coverage, Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 3(a), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986). 
This indicates that if Congress wants to exclude any 
given profession from the full force of the ADEA, it 
knows exactly how to do so. The more cynical, public 
choice interpretation is that state and local 
governments, or police and fire departments were 
particularly effective lobbyists. That same public 
choice analysis suggests, however, that the statutory 
indulgence they obtained should not be extended to 
employers who were unable to bargain for it. See 
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be extended by analogy to a group of employees who 
carry out quite different functions. Analogies in 
our legal system depend on identifying an underlying 
principle by which the different cases can be 
regarded as legally equivalent.253 The EEOC’s 
unsuccessful efforts to identify a valid test for 
fitness suggests that there is no such principle. 
Neither courts nor agencies have been willing to 
expand these exceptions from the coverage of the 
ADEA beyond their explicit boundaries. They have 
concluded that airline pilots are a category of 
employee specifically excluded from the terms of the 
ADEA by separate statutory enactment, and therefore, 
in effect, subject to a particular BFOQ under the 
ADEA.254 Beginning in 1959, a Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) regulation established the 
mandatory retirement limit for pilots at a maximum 
age of sixty.255 Courts treated this rule as a BFOQ 
as a matter of law that could not be challenged 
under the ADEA.256 In 2007, Congress enacted the Fair 
Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (the “Age 65 
Law”),257 which raised the mandatory retirement age 
to sixty-five and established it as definitive.258 
 
generally Dennis C. Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 472-97 
(2003). 
253. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 76-83 (1991). 
254. See 49 U.S.C. §44729 - Age Standards for Pilots. 
255. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1987) (“No person may serve as 
a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations . . . if 
that person has reached his 60th birthday.”). 
256. See, e.g, EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1220 (1988) 
(holding that FAA Age-60 rule for commercial pilots does 
not necessarily apply to pilots of corporate aircraft); 
EEOC v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 626 F. Supp. 182, 186-
87 (W.D. Tex., 1985) (explaining that the FAA Age-60 
rule is relevant evidence to the company’s claim that 
its own Age-60 rule is a BFOQ). 
257. Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. 110-
135, 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (2007). 
258. Prior to this change, the Federal Aviation 
Administration had asked for input from the EEOC as to 
whether age 60 could be supported as a BFOQ. The EEOC 
confirmed that it could not as, as there was no evidence 
of an increase in accident rate as pilots neared age 60. 
The EEOC made clear that it favored the elimination 
entirely of upper age limits for commercial airline 
pilots, as individualized assessment for pilots of all 
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That this age-related presumption about pilot 
competency was established, first by regulation and 
then by statute, indicates that Congress and the 
courts understood that such presumptions would be 
otherwise forbidden under current law, even for 
commercial airline pilots. 
While the mandatory retirement age for commercial 
pilots is outside the reach of the ADEA, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Exxon 
Corporation259 decided that the company could mandate 
retirement of its pilots as a BFOQ.260 The Fifth 
Circuit rejected an ADEA challenge, basing its 
decision on the existence of the FAA regulation, the 
absence of any material difference between piloting 
a corporate plane and piloting a commercial plane, 
and the fact that corporate pilots and commercial 
pilots share the same airspace.261 The court extended 
these principles by analogy, as it saw no functional 
difference between the groups and therefore found 
them legally equivalent. If the company’s activity 
had been functionally distinguishable, the result 
might have been different.262 
Granted, the focus for age-based screening 
proponents is not on implementing a mandatory 
retirement age for physicians. However, some argue 
that the functional similarities between pilots and 
physicians—like requiring a sophisticated skill set 
and working in settings where death and other grave 
harms could result from error—are sufficient to 
 
ages could assess skills and health, but had agreed to 
age 65 as an interim step towards that goal. See U.S. 
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Opinion Letter on FAA Age 
60 Rule (Nov. 15, 2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
foia/letters/2006/adea_individualizedassessment_faa60r
ule.html. 
259. EEOC v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 560 Fed. Appx. 282, 290 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
260. Id. at 289. 
261. Id. at 287. 
262. One final factor that limits analogies to EEOC v. Exxon 
is that Congress had granted the EEOC an opportunity to 
provide alternatives to using age as a BFOQ for 
predicting which pilots over 60 would be at risk for 
sudden incapacitation. Because the EEOC ultimately did 
not offer such recommendations, age as a BFOQ was 
preserved. 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (g)(1) (2007). 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
145 
justify discriminating against older physicians and 
to allow testing that would assure cognitive and 
technical competence.263 The analogy, however, is 
weak. The statutes and regulations to which pilots 
are subject, including mandatory health and skills 
monitoring,264 seem to distinguish them from other 
professions. People in many jobs, including taxicab 
drivers and construction equipment operators can 
also cause death or injury if they lost 
functionality or worked in an impaired state.265 In 
view of Congress’ specific motivations for treating 
pilots differently, no analogy between physicians 
and pilots justifies removing older physicians from 
the ADEA’s protections. 
Some proponents of age-based testing might also 
invoke the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (the “ADA 
1975”)266 to argue that screening for cognitive 
 
263. See, e.g., Maryn McKenna, Aging Gracefully? Patient 
Safety Advocates Call for Ongoing Skills Assessments for 
Older Physicians, 58 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 3 (2011); Scott 
Humphreys & Doris C. Gundersen, The Aging Physician, 12 
NEWSLETTER OF THE COLORADO PHYSICIAN HEALTH PROGRAM (Summer 2013). 
Donald D. Trunkey, Assessing Competency: A Tale of Two 
Professions, 192 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 385, 392 (2001). 
264. 14 C.F.R § 67(2017); see also Synopsis of Medical 
Standards, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Apr. 3, 2006), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org
/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/ame/guide/standa
rds/; 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (g)(1) (2017) (requiring all 
pilots, irrespective of age, to undergo the same 
frequency of medical examinations and to meet the same 
medical standards); 16 C. F. R. 
§61.56 (c)(2012)(providing for biannual piloting skills 
review). 
265. In fact, physicians typically may be less likely to cause 
harm due to sudden incapacity than some of these other 
occupations because physicians tend to work with a team 
with other healthcare professionals who can step in if 
needed. 
266. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 
(2011); 34 C.F.R. § 110(2016). § 6102 states that 
“[p]ursuant to regulations prescribed under section 6103 
of this title, and except as provided by section 6103(b) 
of this title and section 6103(c) of this title, no 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance (emphasis added). 
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impairment is authorized. This statute, enacted 
after the ADEA, applies to “any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance,” which 
includes hospitals as recipients of Medicare and 
Medicaid payments.267 While it prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of age, it allows for 
exceptions if the federally assisted program or 
activity “reasonably takes into account age as a 
factor necessary to the normal operation or the 
achievement of any statutory objective of such 
program or activity.”268 
The ADA 1975, however, does not permit a 
healthcare organization to conduct age-based 
testing for three reasons. First, because age is not 
predictive of performance, it cannot be a factor 
necessary to an organization’s operations or 
achievement of goals. Second, the goals of most 
healthcare organizations, although important, are 
not statutory. Third, and most importantly, the 
statute expressly states that “[n]othing in this 
chapter shall be construed to amend or modify the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as 
 
267. See 42 C.F.R. 489.10 (a)(2017) (“Any of the providers 
specified in § 489.2 may request participation in 
Medicare . . . (b) In order to participate in the 
Medicare program, the provider must meet the applicable 
civil rights requirements of . . . (3) the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975 . . . ”); 42 C.F.R. 
489.2(b)(2017) (“The following providers are subject to 
the provisions of this part: (1) Hospitals . . . ”). See 
also, Phoebe W. Williams, Age Discrimination in the 
Delivery of Health Care Services to Our Elders, 11 
MARQUETTE’S ELDER ADVISOR 1, 28 (2009). 
268. 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (b)(1)(A)(2011). See also Jessica D. 
Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the 
Federal Age Discrimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing 
of Medical Care, 37 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 993, 1031. Under 
45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (1987), the test for the “normal 
operation” exception of the ADA 1975 has four elements. 
The elements are evocative of the Tamiami test to allow 
the BFOQ exception to the ADEA. The exception is allowed 
if: (a) Age is used as a measure or approximation of one 
or more other characteristics; and (b) The other 
characteristic(s) must be measured or approximated in 
order for the normal operation of the program or activity 
to continue . . . ; and (c) The other characteristic(s) 
can be reasonably measured or approximated by the use of 
age; and (d) The other characteristic(s) are impractical 
to measure directly on an individual basis. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
147 
amended, or to affect the rights of responsibilities 
of any person or party pursuant to such Act.”269 That 
is, the ADA 1975 applies anti-discrimination 
protections in contexts other than employment,270 for 
example, educational institutions.271 In the 
healthcare context, the ADA 1975 might allow 
restricting applications, on an operational basis, 
from high school students under the age of fifteen 
who wish to volunteer, but it cannot be reasonably 
read as justifying age-based testing of late-career 
physicians protected by the ADEA. 
B.  Age-Related Screening and the ADA 
In addition to its violation of the ADEA, age-
based screening for cognitive impairment is also 
likely to violate a second major federal law, the 
ADA,272 because such screening (1) ignores 
prohibitions that prevent employers from requiring 
medical examination of existing employees without 
 
269. 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (c) (2)(2017). 
270. See Action Alliance v. Heckler 789 F.2d 931 (1986), n. 
1 (“The ADA [1975] prohibits discrimination with regard 
to any type of benefit but applies only to ‘programs or 
activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” The 
ADEA, on the other hand, proscribes discrimination only 
in relation to employment.”). See also Silver, supra 
note 268, at 1043 (The ADA [1975] involves both 
employment opportunities and programs providing benefits 
to individuals). 
271. See Age Discrimination: Overview of the Law, U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/rights/guid/ocr/ageoverview.
html (last updated Oct. 15, 2015). See also Cannon v. 
Univ. of Health Sciences 710 F.2d 351 (1984) 
(“(HEW) . . . interpretive regulations . . . specified 
that age could not be considered by medical schools in 
making admission decisions. 45 C.F.R. Part 90 (1979).”). 
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq (2017); US Dep’t of Justice 
Civil Rights Div., Employment (Title 1), ADA, 
https://www.ada.gov/ada_title_I.htm (last visited Apr. 
9, 2018) (Title I of the ADA “prohibits private 
employers, State and local governments, employment 
agencies and labor unions from discriminating against 
qualified individuals with disabilities in job 
application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment. The ADA covers employers 
with 15 or more employees.”). 
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cause and (2) misconstrues the “business necessity” 
defense. 
1.  ADA Prohibitions 
The ADA is clear that an employer may conduct a 
job-related medical inquiry and examination after 
making an employment offer but before employment 
begins only if all entering employees are subject 
to such an evaluation.273 Thus, physicians can be 
subject to an employer-mandated medical 
examination274 related to their ability to perform 
the essential functions of the job275 with or without 
the need for “reasonable accommodation.”276 An 
accommodation is a change in the work environment 
or a change from the customary way of doing things 
that allows a person with a disability to do the 
job.277 The employer is only obligated to provide 
reasonable accommodations that do not create “undue 
hardship” for the employer.278 Whether the 
accommodation will impose undue hardship depends on 
a variety of factors that include the cost of the 
accommodation relative to the resources of the 
company, the type of operations that the company 
engages in, and the impact the accommodation will 
 
273. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2)-(3)(2017). 
274. The use of various pre-employment tests is widespread, 
and apparently increasing. See Kimberli R. Black, 
Personality Screening in Employment, 32 AM. BUS. L. J 69, 
69 (1994); Susan J. Stabile, The Use of 
Personality Tests As a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit Worth 
the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 287 (2002). 
Although such testing is explicitly permitted by the 
ADA, questions have been raised about whether it can be 
used to circumvent the ADA prohibitions. See Sujata S. 
Menjoge, Testing the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law: 
How Employers Use of Pre-Employment Psychological and 
Personality Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA, 
82 N.C.L. REV. 326, 329 (2003). 
275. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8)(2009); 29 C.F.R §. 1630.2(n)(2016). 
276. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(2017); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(2016); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 
§ 1630.2(o) (1997). 
277. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue 
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 
17, 2002). 
278. 29 C.F.R. §1630.15(d) (2017). 
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have on the operation of the facility.279 Reasonable 
accommodation may include providing physically 
accessible facilities for employees with 
disabilities, modified work schedules, equipment 
modification, and readers or interpreters.280 
Once the person begins work, however, employers 
are restricted in what they may ask or require of 
the employee related to medical issues.281 Section 
12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA states that: 
A covered entity shall not require a medical 
examination and shall not make inquiries of an 
employee as to whether such employee is an 
individual with a disability or as to the nature 
or severity of the disability, unless such 
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business 
necessity.282 
Significantly, the ADA covers perceived 
disability as well, stating: 
An individual meets the requirement of ‘being 
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the 
individual establishes that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under this 
chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not 
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit 
a major life activity.283 
Thus, being viewed, labeled, treated, or spoken of 
as disabled entitles an individual to ADA 
protections, even if the individual has no 
 
279. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(p)(2)(2017). 
280. 42 U.S.C. §12111 (9)(2017). 
281. 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4)(A)(2017) . 
282. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)(2017). See Bates v. Dura 
Automotive Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 
2014) (holding “subsection (d)(4) prohibits employers 
from requiring medical examinations and disability 
inquiries “of an employee,” regardless of whether (s)he 
has a disability”). 
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)(2017); See also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(g) (2017). 
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disability in fact.284 Congress made it clear that 
“[t]his section of the definition of disability was 
meant to express our understanding that unfounded 
concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or 
prejudice about disabilities are often just as 
disabling as actual impairments, and our 
corresponding desire to prohibit discrimination 
founded on such perceptions.”285 
A crucial question is whether the terms within 
Section 12112(d)(4)(A) apply only to situations 
arising on an individual basis because both the 
statute and regulations refer to “an employee” 
rather than “employees”. The alternative is that the 
employer could inquire into and examine groups of 
employees by claiming the need to ensure that each 
person within that group could still perform the 
essential functions of the job with or without a 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
284. It should be noted, however, that courts have not been 
particularly receptive to claims under the “regarded as” 
provision. See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 
800, 806 (5th Cir. 1997); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 
Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 912-13 (11th Cir.1996), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1030 (1997); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 
F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir.1996); Wooten v. Farmland 
Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir.1995) (The reason may 
be that this claim depends upon the employer’s 
subjective attitude, which is difficult to prove. 
Testing physicians above a given age for cognitive 
impairment, however, might well be a situation where 
this claim would be well-founded. It would be difficult 
for a healthcare organization to explain this policy 
without claiming that it regards all older physicians as 
likely to be suffering from such a disability.). 
285. 154 CONG. REC. S88, 42 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Harkin). In Appendix A to Part 35 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, the Department of 
Justice expands on this statement by stating that 
“although an individual may have an impairment that does 
not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, 
the reaction of others may prove just as disabling.” 28 
C.F.R. pt. 35, appx. A (2010) citing School Bd. of Nassau 
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) (superseded 
by statute). The Department of Justice continued by 
stating that: “a person who is denied services or 
benefits by a public entity because of myths, fears, and 
stereotypes associated with disabilities would be 
covered” by the ADA under the “regarded as” portion of 
the definition of disability. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, appx. A 
(2010). 
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The Enforcement Guidance from the EEOC286 takes 
the first position, that the ADA generally does not 
allow disability-related inquiries or medical 
examinations of employees except when the employer 
has a reasonable belief based on evidence that a 
particular individual is suffering from a medical 
condition that impairs job performance or poses a 
“direct threat.”287 The ADA defines “direct threat” 
as “a significant risk to the health or safety of 
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 
accommodation.”288 The employer’s reasonable belief 
may be based on direct observation or reliable 
information.289 The EEOC’s stance is that inquiry and 
examination are not to be used to determine whether 
an employee has a disability where there is no 
reason to suspect one. This means the employer can 
only make inquiries and require job-related 
examinations on a “for cause” basis. If an employer 
cannot conduct a “fishing expedition” on an 
individual employee, it certainly cannot require 
testing of an entire group of physicians over a 
certain age because of a perception290 they are 
likely to suffer from cognitive impairment. 
Furthermore, it would seem implausible that the 
employer could have observational or informational 
evidence for every member of the group that would 
justify making disability-related inquiries or 
 
286. EEOC Enforcement Guidance NO. 915.002, Disability-Related 
Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (2000), 
available at http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-
inquiries.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. 
287. See id. 
288. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). With respect to healthcare 
workers, courts have held that conditions posing a 
direct threat include attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD). See Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 
F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir., 1998); for HIV infection, see 
Estate of Mauro By and Through Mauro v. Borgess Med. 
Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 411 (6th Cir. 1998); for alcoholism, 
see Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 
671-72 (7th Cir. 2000); and for drug addiction, see 
Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 438 (8th 
Cir., 2007). 
289. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 286, at A5-6. 
290. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)(2017). 
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ordering job-related exams. Therefore, these mass 
inquiries or examinations would constitute 
disability discrimination under the ADA. 
2. The “Job-Related and Consistent with Business 
Necessity” Defense 
The ADA and its implementing regulations do not 
define when a periodic medical examination or 
inquiry is “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.”291 A proponent of age-based testing might 
argue that employers can conduct en masse screening 
if relevant and essential to the business. Yet this 
interpretation is too broad, because the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance limits the occupations for 
which it allows periodic medical examinations, and 
only expressly allows such testing for “positions 
affecting public safety.”292 While physicians must 
be mindful about the safety aspects of their job, 
they do not fall under this rubric. The EEOC’s 
Office of Legal Counsel, writing to a city employer 
who wished to implement periodic medical 
examinations for its bus drivers, clarified that 
positions of public safety include police, 
firefighters, and private security officers who 
“pursue and detain fleeing criminal suspects.”293 The 
letter noted further that while airline pilots are 
also among those where “public safety is integral 
to the job,” their periodic testing is federally 
mandated.294 The EEOC said that city bus drivers are 
 
291. 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(6)(2017). 
292. EEOC Guidance, supra note 286, at B8 and C18. 
293. EEOC Informal Discussion Letter on Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Periodic Testing (Feb. 15, 2008), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/
letters/2008/ada_ltr_re_periodic_testing_feb_15_2008.h
tml [hereinafter EEOC ADA Letter]. 
294. See 14 C.F.R. 61.121, 61.23 (2005). Federal law also 
requires periodic medical examinations for certain 
occupations where fitness-for-duty certificates are 
required. These include commercial truck drivers (49 
C.F.R. §§ 39.41, 39.45 (2005), marine pilots (46 C.F.R. 
§ 10.709 (2005), and hoist operators in open pit mines 
(30 C. F. R. § 56.19057 (2005). For an in-depth 
discussion, see Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Matter of Life and 
Death - Why the ADA Permits Mandatory Periodic Medical 
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not in a position of public safety because “the 
magnitude of the potential harm resulting from a bus 
versus an airline accident makes the job of a city 
bus driver qualitatively different.” The EEOC 
explained: 
[U]nlike the job of a police officer or 
firefighter, the job of a bus driver does not 
exist for the primary and specific purpose of 
protecting the general public from harm by 
outside forces and preventing significant 
injury and harm. Therefore, we do not believe 
that bus drivers fit squarely within the very 
narrow definition of “positions affecting 
public safety” as described in our guidance.295 
Thus, any interpretation suggesting that that 
physicians are in a position affecting public safety 
is not supported by the statutory language of the 
ADA, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance,296 or EEOC 
correspondence. Only one federal law defines some 
physicians as public safety officers: physicians who 
serve as part of a public rescue squad or ambulance 
as defined by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.297 
Even if advocates for age-based testing of 
physicians were to succeed in arguing that 
physicians, as a group, should fall under the public 
safety exception, or that en masse screening for 
cognitive competency is justifiable under the 
business necessity clause, they would not be able 
to limit testing to older physicians. The ADA would 
require hospitals, like other employers allowed the 
 
Examinations of “Remote-Location” Employees, 66 LA. L. 
REV. 681, 694-96 (2006). 
295. Campbell, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
296. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630(r)(2016). 
297. 42 U.S.C. §10284(9)(2017)(defining “public safety 
officers” as public law enforcement officers, 
firefighters, chaplains, Federal Emergency Manage-ment 
Agency (FEMA) officials, or members of a rescue squad or 
ambulance crew who engage in rescue activity or in the 
provision of emergency medical services). These 
individuals are allowed specific tax benefits under 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 
120 Stat. 780. See also Department of Treasury, 
Publication 575: Pension and Annuity Income (2016). 
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business necessity defense, to administer the same 
“narrowly tailored” examinations “to address 
specific job-related concerns”298 to all physicians 
they employ without distinction by age.299 In other 
words, if hospitals hold verification of cognitive 
status essential to job preparedness and, as a 
result, argue that they should be exempt from 
requiring individualized reasonable belief or 
proving direct threat, they would need to screen not 
only those over sixty, sixty-five, or seventy, but 
in fact, all physicians on their staff, and with the 
same periodicity. 
Some courts, however, have begun to expand the 
business necessity defense. In EEOC v. Exxon 
Corp.,300 the EEOC sued on behalf of a group of 
employees whose demotion was based on a disability 
even where the disability did not currently affect 
their ability to do their jobs.301 After the chief 
officer of the vessel, a recovering alcoholic, was 
found to be legally drunk at the time of the Exxon 
Valdez disaster,302 Exxon prohibited employees who 
received treatment for substance abuse from serving 
in certain “safety-sensitive, little-supervised 
 
298. EEOC Guidance, supra note 286, at C18. 
299. Id. (See Examples A-C). 
300. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir., 2000). 
301. Id. (“[Exxon’s] policy permanently removes any employee 
who has undergone treatment for substance abuse from 
certain safety-sensitive, little-supervised 
positions . . . pursuant to its policy, Exxon demoted 
employees who underwent treatment several decades 
ago.”); see also, Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Exxon 
for Disability Act Violation, Press Release (June 28, 
1995). (“EEOC asserts . . . an employer must assess that 
person’s current ability to safely perform the essential 
functions of his or her job . . . like all direct-threat 
determinations, it must be done through an 
individualized assessment based on medical analysis or 
other objective factual evidence. The determination 
cannot be based on subjective perceptions, irrational 
fears, patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes.”). 
302. David Lauter, Legally Drunk Ship’s Captain Fired by 
Exxon, L.A. TIMES, Mar 31, 1989; AP, A Question Recurs: 
Was Hazelwood Drunk?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 25, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/25/us/a-question-
recurs-was-hazelwood-drunk.html. 
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positions.”303 The EEOC argued that Exxon violated 
the ADA because it failed to perform individualized 
assessments to prove that each employee affected by 
the company’s action posed a direct threat to public 
safety.304 Reversing the court below, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the business 
necessity defense was not subject to the direct 
threat clause in cases where the employer 
established a safety-based qualification standard 
applicable to all employees of a class.305 The court 
further clarified that employers need not prove that 
an employee is a direct threat unless the employer 
had not established a qualification standard.306 
The ADA protects employees with a past history 
of substance abuse,307 but not current substance 
abuse.308 In Exxon, the employer did not claim that 
 
303. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d. at 872. 
304. Id. at 873 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 12113). 
305. Id. at 875. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 511 F.3d 993 
(9thCir.2007) (“[W]hen an employer asserts a blanket 
safety-based qualification stan-dard . . . and that 
qualification standard screens out or tends to screen 
out an individual with a disability, the 
employer . . . bears the burden of showing that the 
higher qualification standard is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, and that performance 
cannot be achieved through reasonable accommodation. 42 
U.S.C. § 12113(a).”). 
306. Such a holding provides incentives to employers to 
proactively establish express qualification standards or 
to draft new policies after they have had to defend an 
employment action requiring proof of direct threat. 
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2017) (“Nothing in subsection 
(a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as a 
qualified individual with a disability an individual who 
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug 
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been 
rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in 
such use; (2) is participating in a supervised 
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such 
use.”). See Skinner v. City of Amsterdam, 824 F. Supp. 
2d 317, 330 (N.D. N.Y. 2010). 
308. 29 U.S.C. § 12114(a)(2017) (“For purposes of this 
subchapter, a qualified individual with a 
disability shall not include any employee or applicant 
who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, 
when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.”). 
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it had evidence of current substance abuse for the 
employees it demoted. However, it argued that the 
employees could not meet its safety qualification 
standard based on the danger of recidivism in an 
unsupervised setting.309 On remanding the case to the 
lower court, the Fifth Circuit clarified that an 
employer cannot use the business necessity defense 
if it took an employment action based on 
“stereotypical assumptions.”310 To support a business 
necessity defense, a “real”311 risk assessment must 
occur that considers the duties of the employees’ 
positions and the magnitude and probability of 
harm.312 The court emphasized that in this case, the 
“rate of recidivism”313 was relevant to the risk 
assessment. 
The Exxon court’s expansive interpretation of the 
business necessity defense,314 however, cannot 
support age-based testing of physicians for 
cognitive impairment as Exxon’s unusual facts 
highlight the defense’s inapplicability to the 
typical practice setting. First, all of the 
employees in Exxon were already identified as having 
a condition with a known high recidivism rate. This 
differs markedly from testing physicians without 
history and without cause. Allowing an employer to 
proactively bar high-risk employees from command 
provides no model for stereotyping age as a 
condition that warrants periodic medical 
examinations as a business necessity. Second, the 
 
309. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d. at 872. 
310. Id. at 875. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Other federal courts interpret the ADA’s business 
necessity defense more restrictively, see, .e.g., Bates 
v. United Parcel Serv., 511 F.3d 974, 996 (9th Cir.2007) 
(“The business necessity standard is quite high, and is 
not [to be] confused with mere expediency,” quoting 
Cripe v. San Jose, 251 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001)); 
Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 951 
(8th Cir. 1999) (stating that employers must show that 
an exam administered to applicants is job-related based 
on the position’s specific skills in order to prevail on 
a business necessity defense under the ADA). 
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Exxon employees would have been commanding in 
isolated, inaccessible settings where others could 
not prevent harm. Physicians in a hospital are 
typically under continual observation by other 
professionals, staff, and patients, and performance 
data are collected. Employers can require assessment 
of an individual employee when evidence raises a 
reasonable belief to justify doing so. Thus, 
categorizing periodic age-based cognitive screening 
of older physicians as a business necessity in the 
absence of cause violates the ADA. 
The reasoning in Exxon, however, introduces the 
possibility that, without violating the ADA, an 
employer could proactively remove a physician from 
practice who has cognitive impairment. Even if 
current accommodations allow the physician to 
perform the essential functions of his job 
successfully,315 if decline in the physician’s 
condition is anticipated and the physician is likely 
to become unable to comply with safety qualification 
standards without warning, then under Exxon, 
business necessity should allow for proactive 
removal from practice. An employer could also defend 
removing a physician if the accommodation required 
for the physician to perform the essential functions 
of practice became too costly, like hiring a full-
time clinician to shadow the physician. Once an 
accommodation becomes “unreasonable” or imposes an 
undue burden on the employer,316 the employer need 
not continue providing it. 
 
315. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (n)(1) (“[E]ssential functions means 
the fundamental job duties of the employment position 
the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 
Judging whether a job function is essential and not 
marginal may include: the position exists for the 
purpose of performing that function, very few people 
within the employment setting are available to perform 
that job function, or the hiree’s expertise is what is 
required for the job.). 
316. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(4)(2016); 1630.2(p)(2016). Four 
examples of when an accommodation created an undue 
burden for an employer, see Smith v. Frank Implement 
Col, 188 Fed.Appx. 549, 551 (8th Cir.2006); Dropinski v. 
Douglas Cty., 298 F.3d 704, 706 (2002); McDaniel v. 
AlliedSignal, Inc., 896 F.Supp. 1482, 1491 (1995); 
Morrissey v. General Mills, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 842, 
843-44 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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C.  Physician Employee Status for Purposes of the 
ADEA and ADA 
As noted, the ADEA and the ADA protect the rights 
of “employees.” However, neither the ADEA nor the 
ADA specify the scope of this term, as the nearly 
identical definitions offered under the ADEA (“an 
individual employed by any employer”)317 and the ADA 
(“an individual employed by an employer”)318 are both 
entirely circular.319 The two statutes are clearly 
applicable where the hospital directly employs the 
physicians.320 The hospital hires and pays them, 
assigns and oversees their work, and can terminate 
them in accordance with their contract.321 Other 
physicians may work within other practice 
structures, for example, a solo or partnership 
practice, a professional corporation, or an 
incorporated medical group.322 Most also seek and are 
 
317. 42 U.S.C. § 630(f)(2012). 
318. 29 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)(2012). See also 
EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003 §2: Threshold Issues 
2-III(A)(1); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (noting that the definition is 
circular). This definition is copied from the one in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e)(f), which is 
thus equally unhelpful. 
319. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 
(1992) (finding that an identical definition in ERISA is 
“completely circular and explains nothing.”). 
320. “Today, roughly 25 percent of all specialty physicians 
who see patients at hospitals” are employed directly by 
the hospital. For primary care physicians, the figure is 
40 percent. Bob Herman, 7 Trends in Hospital-Employed 
Physician Compensation, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (Jan. 25, 
2013), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/compensation-
issues/7-trends-in-hospital-employed-physician-
compensation.html; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 446-47 (1984). 
321. Alice G. Gosfield, Negotiating Hospital Contracts: What 
Physicians Need to Know Before Signing, MED. ECON. (Mar 
24, 2014). 
322. See New Physician Practice Options: Choosing Your 
Practice Settings, STAFF CARE (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.staffcare.com/physician-practice-options-
choosing-your-practice-setting/. 
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granted “hospital privileges”323 so they can care for 
patients who require inpatient or other hospital 
services. Privileges are tailored to the clinical 
competencies and training of each physician. 
Hospital privileges allow them to use hospital 
services,324 like nursing and support staff, 
laboratory services, operating rooms, procedure 
suites, equipment, and intensive care units, and to 
call upon other physicians with privileges, for 
consultation and referral.325 
The question is whether physicians who structure 
their practice in ways other than direct employment 
by a hospital are “employees” for purposes of the 
ADEA and the ADA. The answer determines whether a 
hospital can require physicians with privileges to 
undergo age-based screening for cognitive 
impairment and take action against their privileges 
on the basis of test results without violating legal 
restrictions on employers described in the previous 
sections. 
 
323. The granting of privileges imposes compliance duties on 
physicians, including following rules for admission 
physicals, writing orders, completing operative reports 
and discharge summaries. See, Letter from Thomas E. 
Hamilton, Director, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS), to State Survey Agency Director (Nov. 
12, 2004), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-
Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertifi
cationGenInfo/downloads/SCLetter05-04.pdf. See also 
Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of 
Hospitals’ Physician Credentialing and Peer Review 
Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 607-08 (2000) 
324. See, e.g., Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital, 514 
F.3d 217, 222 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
325. See Andrew K. Dolan & Richard S. Ralston, Hospital 
Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 HOUS. L. 
REV.707, 709-23 (1980) (providing a general description 
of admitting privileges arrangements); Jeffrey E. 
Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some 
Economic Implications, 8 BELL J. ECON. 467, 470 (1977) 
(stating that hospitals organize as separate firms, with 
a demand division consisting of the administration and 
a supply division consisting of the physicians); Philip 
C. Kissam, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges, 70 CAL. L. 
REV 595, 603-13 (1982) (providing a description of 
formal, political and economic features of admitting 
privileges in antitrust context). 
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This question is complicated because of the way 
that practice structure varies and the way that 
hospitals staff clinical services. The hospital’s 
medical staff may include physicians from a 
combination of practice settings, or it might 
primarily include physicians practicing within a 
large multispecialty medical group providing 
virtually all of the hospital’s services, for 
example, within academic medical centers326 or large 
“staff model” health maintenance organizations.327 
Hospitals also commonly contract with single 
specialty medical groups to provide coverage for 
specific services, such as anesthesia, emergency, 
diagnostic imaging, and hospitalist care.328 These 
practice and financial arrangements for the 
provision of health care, a matter of great public 
controversy in recent years,329 continue to evolve. 
Given this profusion of business and professional 
relationships, it is essential to discern some 
underlying principles to resolve questions about a 
physician’s employment status. In the typical common 
law employment situation, a single entity would 
exercise both fiscal and managerial control over the 
 
326. See Thomas Enders & Joanne Conroy, Advancing the 
Academic Health System for the Future, A Report from the 
AAMC Advisory Panel on Health Care 1, 9 (2014). 
(discussing that successful academic medical centers 
will align hospitals, clinical faculty, medical school, 
management accountability, and enterprise-level 
structure). 
327. See Jesse Pines et al., Kaiser Permanente—California: A 
Model for Integrated Care for the Ill and Injured, THE 
BROOKINGS INST. 1, 3 (May 4, 2015) (discussing that all 
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals are staffed through an 
exclusive contract with Permanente Medical Group). 
328. A hospitalist is an internal medicine or pediatric 
specialist whose practice is dedicated to taking care of 
hospital inpatients. Bonnie Darves, Locked Out: Why Some 
Hospitals Are Limiting Which Hospitalists Can Work on Their 
Wards, TODAY’S HOSPITALIST (Oct. 2004), https://www.todays
hospitalist.com/locked-out-why-some-hospitals-are-
limiting-which-hospitalists-can-work-on-their-wards/. 
329. C. Stephen Redhead & Janet Kinzer, Legislative Actions 
in the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses to Repeal, 
Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act, CONGRESSIONAL 
RES. SERV. (Feb. 7, 2017), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43289.pdf. 
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employee.330 That is, this entity—the employer—would 
both pay and supervise the employee, with these two 
modes of control connected to each other. A feature 
of the admitting privileges structure is to 
disaggregate these functions, with the physician’s 
practice, corporation, or medical group generally 
exercising fiscal control over physician billing 
while the hospital maintains significant managerial 
authority331 over the services that are provided 
within its facilities. Thus, a physician may be 
considered an independent contractor for financial 
purposes,332 and simultaneously regarded as an 
employee of the hospital for other purposes, 
especially practice-related issues within the 
hospital.333 Hospitals exert control over physicians 
through their power to set rules and policies 
affecting medical practice.334 All physicians who 
wish to perform procedures and order tests, for 
example, are subject to the same rules regarding 
timing and availability of hospital facilities and 
 
330. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1007 - Common-law employee. 
331. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: 
The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1713, 1717 (1987). Managerial authority pertains to 
the actions taken by an entity to “administer 
organizational domains dedicated to instrumental 
conduct.” 
332. See Leon S. Conlon, Peer Review and Public Policy, 19 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1237, 1237 (1988); see generally, 
Michael R. Lowe, Stirring Muddled Waters: Are Physicians 
with Hospital Admitting Privileges Considered Employees 
under Title VII or the ADA Act When Alleging an 
Employment Discrimination Claim?, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE 
L. 119 (1996). 
333. See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So.2d 209, 213 (Fla 
1989); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 226, 229 (Wash., 
1984) (en banc). 
334. See Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent 
Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy, and 
Ethics, 64 CASE W. L. REV. 455, 500 (2013) (The hospital’s 
culture exerts control over how physicians “process and 
analyze information,” and they internalize its “values 
and norms.” Physicians tend to trust internal colleagues 
more than colleagues outside of the organization and 
practice in accordance with how things are done within 
the organization. Id. at 504-505.). 
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equipment, performing “time-outs,”335 and following 
infection control policies such as those related to 
hand hygiene336 and universal precautions.337 
Hospitals also generally delegate portions of their 
duties to an organized medical staff,338 especially 
in regards to credentialing, privileging, and 
monitoring clinician performance.339 The medical 
 
335. See Nancy M. Saufl, Universal Protocol for Preventing 
Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery, 19 J. 
PERIANESTHESIA NURSING 348, 349-50 (2004). The time-out 
procedure is designed to reduce the risk of error in the 
operating room. The team confers just before the surgery 
starts as a last chance to make certain that the patient 
is the right patient, the procedure they are about to 
do is the correct procedure on the correct site on the 
body, and that all needed equipment and implants are 
present in the operating room. 
336. See Thomas R. Talbot et al., Sustained Improvement in 
Hand Hygiene Adherence: Utilizing Shared Accountability 
And Financial Incentives, 34 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1129, 1134-35 (2013). 
337. Universal precautions are utilized in all cases where 
contact with blood or body fluids is possible to prevent 
the transmission of bloodborne pathogens. Healthcare 
workers don appropriate protective barriers (e.g., 
masks, gloves, gowns, and/or goggles) to prevent 
exposure. See Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Perspectives in Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion Update: Universal Precautions for 
Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodborne Pathogens 
in Health-Care Settings, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 
(1988), available at https://www.cdc.g
ov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000039.htm. 
338. See e.g. 42 C.F.R.§ 482.12 (a)(2-5)(2016); THE JOINT 
COMMISSION COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION & CERTIFICATION MANUAL at 
LD.01.05.01 (2018) (“The . . . hospital has an organized 
medical staff that is accountable to the governing 
body.”)[hereinafter TJC Standards]. 
339. See TJC Standards at MS.03.01.01 (“The organized medical 
staff oversees the quality of patient care, treatment, 
and services provided by practitioners privileged 
through the medical staff process.”). 
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staff is at once both its own entity340 and subsidiary 
to and part of the larger enterprise.341 
Before 2003, federal courts used two competing 
standards to determine what “employer” meant in 
federal statutes that did not include a true 
definition. The older standard, re-stated in United 
States v. Silk,342 was based upon the common law 
principle that employment status depended on the 
degree of control a company exercised over an 
individual.343 Shortly after that decision, however, 
the court articulated an alternative test in Bartels 
 
340. Courts have differing views as to whether the medical 
staff is a legal entity. Some find it to be an 
independent legal entity. See Sheryl Tatar Dacso & 
Robert Bennett, Is There A Case for an Independent 
Medical Staff, LEGAL TALK (Jan. 2007), 
http://bennettlawfirm.typepad.com/
the_bennett_law_firm/files/independent_medical_staff.p
df (discussing a California Superior Court ruling which 
determined that a hospital’s Medical Staff was an 
independent legal entity that could be sued). Others 
characterize it as an unincorporated association. See 
Avera Marshall Med. Staff v. Avera Marshall, 857 N.W.2d 
695, 700 (Minn. 2014); Corleto v. Shore Mem’l Hosp., 350 
A.2d 531, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). Still, 
others view it as a subordinate to the hospital (see, 
e.g., Exeter Hospital Medical Staff v. Board of 
Trustees, 810 A.2d 53, 56-57 (N.H. 2002) (“[T]he medical 
staff in this case is not a legal entity separate and 
apart from the hospital, but rather is a subordinate 
administrative unit dependent upon and accountable to 
the hospital . . . [t]he medical staff has no legal life 
of its own and is merely one component of the hospital 
corporation.”). 
341. See Alice G. Gosfield, Whither Medical Staffs?: 
Rethinking the Role of the Staff in the New Quality Era, 
In: HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 141, 145 (2003) (“The clinical 
culture of the hospital is broader than the medical staff 
culture, and in the last analysis, is the reflection of 
the extent to which the operations and attention of the 
institution are focused around and supportive of ever 
improving clinical quality of care in all of the broader 
reaches of current definitions of quality.”). 
342. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1947) (determining 
whether the company or the individual is liable for 
Social Security taxes). 
343. Id. at 714-15. 
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v. Birmingham,344 which focused on the “economic 
realities” of the relationship between the 
parties.345 In Spirides v. Reinhardt, a sex 
discrimination case brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act,346 the court elaborated upon this 
test.347 The Spirides court identified eleven factors 
relevant to determining whether a plaintiff was an 
employee for purposes of Title VII.348 Several courts 
then used the Spirides factors to determine whether 
doctors with admitting privileges were employees 
under the ADEA.349 
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
the meaning of the term “employee” in Clackamas 
 
344. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) 
(determining whether the company or the individual is 
liable for Social Security taxes). 
345. Id. at 831-32. 
346. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 828 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
347. Id. 
348. Id. (The Court articulated these factors as follows: 
“(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether 
the work usually is done under the direction of a 
supervisor or is done by a specialist without 
supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular 
occupation; (3) whether the ‘employer’ or the individual 
in question furnishes the equipment used and the place 
of work; (4) the length of time during which the 
individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, 
whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which 
the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or 
both parties, with or without notice and explanation; 
(7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the 
work is an integral part of the business of the 
‘employer’; (9) whether the worker accumulates 
retirement benefits; (10) whether the ‘employer’ pays 
social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the 
parties.”). 
349. Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 
272-73 (5th Cir. 1988), 488 U.S. 956 (cert. denied); 
Mallare v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) affd, 914 F2d 243 (3d Cir 1990) (relying 
on EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing Co., 713 F. 2d 32 (3rd 
Cir., 1983), which relied on Spirides at 37). See also 
Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hospital, 853 F.2d 
762, 766 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1013 
(1989) (holding that the test depends on “economic 
realities”). 
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Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, an ADA case. 
The question concerned the employment status of 
physicians in a professional corporation rather than 
their status in a hospital.350 The professional 
corporation in Clackamas moved to dismiss a former 
employee’s suit arguing that because the physicians 
in the corporation, as shareholder-directors, did 
not count as employees, the corporation had too few 
employees for the ADA to apply.351 
Despite the difference in practice setting, the 
test that the Court used is relevant to ADEA and ADA 
suits against a hospital. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Stevens returned to the common law control 
test.352 He conceded that the mode of doing business 
at issue in the case, as a professional corporation, 
was unknown at common law but nonetheless held that 
common law principles should control the 
determination.353 He then continued: “[a]t common law 
the relevant factors defining the master-servant 
relationship focus on the master’s control over the 
servant . . . We think that the common-law element 
of control is the principal guidepost that should 
be followed in this case.”354 Justice Stevens stated 
that this conclusion was supported by a compliance 
manual issued by the EEOC, the agency charged with 
implementing the ADA, which identified the crucial 
issue as “‘whether the employer controls the means 
and manner of the worker’s work performance.’”355 
While the language did not appear in an agency rule 
entitled to Chevron deference, the Court held that 
it was entitled to the Skidmore deference356 and 
 
350. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells 538 U.S. 
440, 442 (2003). 
351. Id. at 442.   
352. Id. at 444-46. 
353. Id. at 447-48. 
354. Id. at 448. 
355. Id. at 449 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0008, 
and n. 71.8). 
356. Id. at 449-50. (The interpretation of a statute in a 
definitive legal determination (such as regulations 
promulgated by notice and comment rule-making or a 
formal adjudication) by the agency charged by Congress 
with implementing a statute is granted deference under 
Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This 
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proceeded to quote the compliance manual’s list of 
six relevant factors357 for determining the extent 
to which the physicians exercised control over the 
organization. The Court then remanded the case with 
the instruction to examine all aspects of the 
employment relationship for “evidence in the record 
that would . . . support a contrary conclusion.”358 
The Clackamas Court’s choice of common law to 
determine the meaning of the term “employee” was 
based on Congressional intent.359 In leaving the term 
 
means that the reviewing court should defer to any 
reasonable interpretation of the law by the agency when 
the term being interpreted is ambiguous. It reverses the 
traditional rule that a reviewing court defers to a trial 
court on issues of fact but reviews interpretations of 
law de novo. If the interpretation is embodied in a less 
definitive pronouncement by the agency, such as an ad 
hoc decision, guidance or compliance manual, it does not 
receive this level of deference, but may nonetheless be 
regarded as “a body of experience and informed judgment” 
that courts can look to for guidance); Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), see, U.S. v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218 (2001)(establishing the boundary between 
Chevron and Skidmore deference)). 
357. Id., citing EEOC, Compliance Manual § 605:0009 (2000) 
(enumerating six factors that help in determining 
whether physicians are employees or proprietors: 
“[w]hether the organization can hire or fire the 
individual or set the rules and regulations of the 
individual’s work . . . Whether and, if so, to what 
extent the organization supervises the individual’s 
work . . . Whether the individual reports to someone 
higher in the organization . . . Whether and, if so, to 
what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization . . . Whether the parties intended that the 
individual be an employee, as expressed in written 
agreements or contracts . . . Whether the individual 
shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization.”). 
358. Id. at 451. 
359. Id. at 445 (“When Congress has used the term “employee” 
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress 
intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency 
doctrine.” citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23.) Justice 
Stevens went on to say: “as Darden reminds us, 
congressional silence often reflects an expectation that 
courts will look to the common law to fill gaps in 
statutory text, particularly when an undefined term has 
a settled meaning at common law. Congress has overridden 
judicial decisions that went beyond the common law in an 
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open-ended, the Court reasoned, Congress expected 
both agency and judicial interpreters to rely on the 
meaning of the term as interpreted at common law.360 
While the Clackamas Court utilized this more 
linguistic analysis based on the common law meaning 
of the term “employee” and avoided an analysis based 
on the broad purpose of the statutes,361 courts must 
consider statutory purpose when applying common law 
meaning to novel situations such as the one the 
medical profession presents.362 Federal anti-
discrimination statutes aim to prevent 
discrimination based on a protected characteristic: 
the ADEA prohibits discrimination based on age, and 
the ADA prohibits discrimination based on 
disability. The crucial question then is to 
determine which entity exercises the control that 
would place it in a position to potentially engage 
in these forbidden forms of discrimination. That 
entity should be regarded as the “employer” for 
purposes of imposing the two Acts’ regulatory 
restrictions. 
The answer depends on the relationship between 
the hospital and the physicians with clinical 
privileges.363 If physicians—whether individual or 
as part of an affiliated medical group—admit 
patients to only one hospital and depend on those 
admissions to maintain their practice,364 then the 
hospital’s managerial authority enables the 
hospital to discriminate against these physicians 
on the basis of age or disability. Specifically, the 
hospital could require physicians to submit to 
cognitive testing without any evidence of impaired 
performance, and then revoke their privileges, 
 
effort to correct “‘the mischief’ at which a statute was 
aimed.” Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 447. 
360. Id. at 447. 
361. Id. at 446 (“The majority’s approach, which paid 
particular attention to ‘the broad purpose of the ADA’” 
does not “fare any better.”). 
362. See Kevin Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 355 (2012) (observing and arguing for judicial use 
of purposivism to interpret administrative regulations). 
363. See Conlon, supra note 332, at 160. 
364. Id. 
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denying them access to its facilities and thereby 
destroying their practice, if they refused to 
comply. The hospital’s ability to discriminate in 
this manner means it is exercising control over 
physicians consistent with the common law meaning 
of the term.365 
However, an employment relationship is two-sided. 
Physicians who rarely use their admitting privileges 
resemble independent contractors rather than 
employees and thus would occupy the sort of position 
that Congress intended to exclude from the ADEA and 
ADA’s coverage. Physicians would also look less like 
employees in the intermediate situation where they 
actively admit to more than one hospital. Although 
the governing principle is the same, resolving each 
situation will depend on the circumstances of each 
particular case. The principle is whether the 
hospital charged with age discrimination exercised 
a sufficient managerial role to constitute control 
within the common law meaning of that term, and 
therefore, was the plaintiff’s employer for purposes 
of the ADEA and ADA. Relevant facts to determine 
when control is sufficient include the centrality 
of using the hospital as part of one’s practice, the 
number of hospitals to which the physician admits 
or to which she could admit,366 and the presence of 
any collusive behavior among the hospitals. If 
hospitals were to collude to impose age-based 
cognitive screening, it would deprive the admitting 
physicians of their apparent choice because they 
would be facing the same rule in all hospitals in a 
given area. 
As with the substance of a BFOQ, excluding 
hospitals from the status of an employer should be 
narrowly construed to effectuate the purposes of the 
ADEA and the ADA. Specifically, the defendant-
hospital’s argument that they are able to impose 
cognitive testing on physicians who are members of 
a separate fiscal entity and take action on the 
 
365. Id. 
366. Diggs v. Harris Hosp. Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 273 
(“[N]o evidence submitted . . . that denial of staff 
privileges at Harris Hospital hampered her ability to 
obtain staff privileges at any other Fort Worth 
hospital.”). 
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results of such testing because these physicians are 
free to get privileges from other hospitals must be 
viewed with suspicion. Such an argument, after all, 
can be made in any employment case where the 
employer is not a monopolist. The practical reasons 
to reject it are that establishing privileges at a 
new hospital will cause a hiatus in income, involve 
considerable inconvenience, and may constitute a 
loss of status. 
Beyond that, however, is a more basic issue: the 
essence of any statute forbidding discrimination in 
employment that imposes additional requirements 
based only on the employee’s protected trait is 
discrimination, and thus illegal per se, whatever its 
practical consequences may be. Even a person who can 
find a better position after he has been fired on 
the basis of race, religion or gender is nonetheless 
the victim of discrimination. The same is true for 
age. 
Thus, the EEOC factors, as endorsed in 
Clackamas,367 strongly support this understanding of 
managerial control. Because hospitals impose rules 
and oversight over physicians and hold them 
accountable, they, in effect, exercise such control. 
That level of control continues to increase today.368 
A variety of legal, economic, and regulatory factors 
further incentivize or mandate hospitals to take 
active roles in monitoring and addressing physician 
behavior and performance irrespective of whether the 
physicians are directly employed or employed by a 
fiscally independent entity. These include: 
 
367. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449. 
368. See generally William B. Drummy III, The Hospital and 
Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON L. 
REV 249 (1974); Daniel M. Mulholland III, The Corporate 
Responsibility of the Community Hospital, 17 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 343, 367 (1986); Christine A. Goeschel et al., 
Responsibility for Quality Improvement and Patient 
Safety, 138 CHEST 171, 172 (2010); Arianne N. Callendar, 
Douglas A. Hastings, Michael C. Helmsley, Corporate 
Responsibility and Health Care Quality: A Resource for 
Health Care Boards of Directors, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL (June 2007), https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/
resource/5601/corporate-responsibility-and-health-
care-quality-a-resource-for-health-care-boards-of-
directors. 
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(1) Evolving common law doctrine. The Clackamas 
Court’s invocation of common law doctrine as the 
background for the federal law meaning of “employee” 
illustrates how the common law evolves over time.369 
The trend in cases involving corporate negligence 
and enterprise liability doctrines is to place 
liability on hospitals and health systems because 
they are in the best position to ensure patient 
safety. According to the seminal case on corporate 
negligence, Darling v. Charleston Community 
Memorial Hospital: 
The conception that the hospital does not 
undertake to treat the patient, does not 
undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, 
but undertakes instead simply to procure them 
to act upon their own responsibility, no longer 
reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as 
their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, 
do far more than furnish facilities for 
treatment.370 
Enterprise liability aims to encourage 
integration of professionals, systems, services, 
and practices into a structure that can exert more 
uniform control and supervision over processes, 
behavior, and performance to prevent future 
injury.371 Its contemporary interpretation reflects 
 
369. See Eisenberg, supra note 253. 
370. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp, 211 
N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965)(citation omitted)(stating that, 
under the corporate negligence doctrine, hospitals may 
be held directly liable to patients for failing to 
adequately assess the competence of healthcare 
professionals.). See also, Mitchell J. Wiet, Darling v. 
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital and Its Legacy, 
14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 399, 408 (2005). (“Darling 
has . . . helped to bring about a quantum leap 
improvement over time in the quality of health care in 
the United States. That is a very good thing, indeed, 
for all health care consumers.”). 
371. William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and The Emerging 
Managed Health Care System, 60 L. CONTEMPORARY PROBS, 159, 
163 (1997). See also, Mantel, supra note 334, at 516-17 
(because organizational culture influences medical 
decision-making, imposing enterprise liability on the 
managerial control of healthcare organizations will 
reduce medical error). 
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“ . . . a system in which health care organizations 
bear responsibility for medical malpractice in 
addition to or instead of individual health 
professionals.”372 
(2) Private regulation.373 The Joint Commission 
(TJC) is a private organization that accredits 
hospitals meeting its compliance standards. 
Accreditation by TJC is widely accepted as an 
assurance of quality.374 TJC standards charge 
hospitals’ governing boards with oversight 
responsibility for the care provided within the 
institution,375 holding the medical staff 
accountable,376 and addressing behaviors that 
undermine a culture of safety.377 TJC also holds 
 
372. Id at 159. See also William R. Trail & Susan Kelley-
Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff Privileges 
Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 315, 329 
(1985); Drummy, supra note 368; James B. 
Cohoon, Piercing the Doctrine of 
Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383 
(1980). 
373. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex 
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New 
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1649–50 (1996) 
(explaining how norms generated within civil society 
become informally codified by private institutions and 
serve as standards, and also incorporated into the legal 
system by serving as sources of common law decisions or 
templates for positive enactments by statute or 
regulation). 
374. See Dallon, supra note 323, at 603 (stating “[t]he 
influence of JCAHO [now The Joint Commission] 
accreditation requirements, including those governing 
medical staffs, is considerable” and most hospitals seek 
such accreditation); Stephen P. Schmaltz et al., 
Hospital Performance Trends on National Quality Measures 
and the Association with Joint Commission Accreditation, 
6 J. HOSP. MED. 454, 454 (2011) (finding that accredited 
hospitals outperform those without accreditation with 
the gap widening over time). 
375. Goeschel, supra note 368, at 172. See also, TJC Standards 
at LD.01.03.01(“The governing body is ultimately 
accountable for the safety and quality of care, 
treatment, and services.”). 
376. TJC Standards at LD.01.05.01 (“The hospital has an 
organized medical staff that is accountable to the 
governing body.”). 
377. See Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety, THE 
JOINT COMMISSION, (Sentinel Event Alert #40), July 9, 2008. 
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hospitals accountable for having “a clearly defined 
process for collecting, investigation, and 
addressing clinical practice concerns.”378 
(3) Public regulation. Hospitals must satisfy the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”) 
Conditions of Participation to be eligible for 
reimbursement.379 CMS holds the governing body 
accountable for the hospital’s conduct,380 quality 
of patient care, and competency of its credentialed 
medical staff.381 CMS also expects the hospital to 
deliver patient-centered care382 and to establish a 
complaint and grievance resolution process to 
address and respond to patients’ concerns about 
quality of care,383 including complaints about 
 
[hereinafter SEA #40]. See also TJC Standards at 
LD.03.01.01. 
378. TJC Standards at MS.09.01.01.01. 
379. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Hospital 
and Critical Access Hospital Conditions of Participation 
42 C.F.R. Part 482 and 485 (2016). 
380. 42 C. F. R. § 482.12 (2016). 
381. 42 C.F.R. 482.12(a) (2016); See Gosfield, supra note 
321, at 148; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) Requirements for Hospital Medical Staff Privileging 
(Nov. 12, 2004) (“Components of . . . qualifications and 
demonstrated competencies would include at least: 
current work practice, special training, quality of 
specific work, patient outcomes, education, maintenance 
of continuing education, adherence to medical staff 
rules, certifications, . . . currency of . . . licensure 
requirement . . . ”). 
382. Gosfield, supra note 321, at 146. See also Jordan M. 
VanLare & Patrick Conway, Value-based Purchasing—
National Programs To Move From Volume To Value, 367 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 292, 293 (2012). CMS performs random 
sampling of hospital patients to learn of their 
experiences of care, utilizing the Hospital Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) 
survey. CMS withholds 1% of Medicare payments, 30% of 
which is tied to HCAHPS scores, to fund incentives of 
the ACA’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program; see 
Shivan Mehta, Patient Satisfaction Reporting and Its 
Implications for Patient Care, 17 AMA J. OF ETHICS 616, 
617 (2015). 
383. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(a)(2) (2016)(“The hospital must 
establish a process for prompt resolution of patient 
grievances and must inform each patient whom to contact 
to file a grievance.”). 
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physicians. The Healthcare Quality Improvement Act 
of 1986 (HCQIA), which sets due process procedural 
standards for taking action against physicians’ 
clinical privileges,384 also requires hospitals to 
report such actions and medical malpractice payouts 
to the National Practitioner Database (“NPDB”). 
Hospitals must also query the NPDB whenever a 
physician applies for medical staff membership and 
clinical privileges.385 
As these forces operate to expand the managerial 
control that hospitals exercise, including their 
obligation to oversee the quality of care provided 
by physicians with admitting privileges, the 
increased control also elevates the importance of 
ensuring that hospitals do not rely on legally 
prohibited criteria to impose burdens on physicians 
or make determinations about privileges. Thus, a 
physician with a qualified disability, including a 
perceived disability, could argue that the hospital 
used “methods of administration that have the effect 
of discrimination on the basis of disability, or 
that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are 
subject to common administrative control.”386 Thus, 
the term “employee” in the ADEA and the ADA should 
 
384. See generally Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986 
(HCQIA) 42 U.S.C. § 11011 et seq. (sets due process 
standards for peer review and actions against clinical 
privileges). HCQIA also requires insurance companies to 
report medical malpractice payments, state medical 
boards to report sanctions, and hospitals to report 
adverse actions against clinical privileges to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). See also Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, THE AMERICAN HEALTH 
LAWYERS ASS’N, 
https://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health%20
Law%20Wiki/HCQIA.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). For 
specified actions that require a report to relevant 
agency; timeliness and contents; confidentiality; 
liability’ fine for failure to make or transmit 
report, see, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 805 
(reporting requirements for peer review bodies). 
385. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-33 (2017); U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services. National Practitioner Data Bank, Chapter 
D: Queries. https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/
resources/aboutGuidebooks.jsp?page=DOverview.jsp (last 
visited Jan. 14. 2018). 
386. 42 U.S. Code § 12112(b)(3) (2017). 
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include physicians with clinical privileges whom the 
hospital does not directly employ. 
Further, the differences between fiscal and 
managerial control favor treating managerial 
control as the guiding factor.387 Relinquishing 
managerial control over physicians who use hospital 
facilities would require a major change in the 
hospital’s operations, a change it would not likely 
choose. Fiscal control, on the other hand, is 
malleable. Drafting a new set of documents can alter 
the corporate form that pays physicians or how it 
disburses their compensation and benefits. To give 
equal or greater weight to fiscal control in 
determining a physician’s status as an employee 
would enable a hospital to circumvent the 
requirements of anti-discrimination statutes 
without significantly affecting the hospital’s 
operations. 
In many cases, the organized medical staff would 
likely play a significant role in implementing an 
age-based screening policy. As a non-employer, the 
medical staff could do this without violating the 
ADEA or ADA. However, because accreditation 
standards for hospitals require, first, that the 
governing body and hospital approve the medical 
staff by-laws388 and, second, that the governing body 
and medical staff collaborate in monitoring 
physician qualifications and quality of care,389 any 
age-based testing policy implemented by the medical 
staff is also a policy of the hospital. 
 
387. See Lowe, supra note 332, at 126 (citing Title I of the 
ADA section 12112(b)(3)). 
388. TJC Standards at MS.01.01.01.02 See also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 482.12(a) (4) (2016)(“The governing body 
must[ . . . ](4) Approve medical staff bylaws and other 
medical staff rules and regulations.”). 
389. See e.g., TJC Standards at MS.01.01.01 and 
LD.01.05.01.06 (medical staff is accountable to the 
governing body), MS.06.01.03.02 and MS.06.01.03.03 (the 
medical staff and hospital are jointly involved in the 
credentialing process); MS.06.01.11 (governing is 
involved in decisions related to initial privileging and 
appointment); LD.01.03.01 (the governing body is ul-
timately accountable for the safety and quality of care, 
treatment, and services). 
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Finally, the ADA’s protections are not limited 
to employees. Title III of the statute states: “[n]o 
individual shall be discriminated against on the 
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment 
of . . . privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
of any place of public accommodation by any person 
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place 
of public accommodation.”390 In Menkowitz v. 
Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that a hospital violated 
Title III by denying staff privileges to a physician 
with a disability that his psychologist certified 
would not impair his ability to treat patients and 
work with others.391 The court found that although 
the plaintiff-physician was not an employee of the 
hospital, he was an “individual” under Title III of 
the ADA.392 Rejecting the hospital’s argument that 
Title III applied only to members of the public 
receiving service from the hospital, the court said: 
“[b]ecause of the appellant’s suspension from the 
active medical staff, he can no longer enjoy the 
hospital’s physical facilities in providing the 
necessary medical and consulting services to his 
patients.”393 Thus, even if non-directly employed 
physicians are not “employees” of the hospital, 
should a hospital require age-based testing of all 
older physicians who work there, it would deprive 
these older physicians of equal enjoyment of 
privileges and advantages. 
IV. Alternative Models for Identifying and 
Responding to Suspected Cognitive Impairment 
The rejection of age-based screening for 
cognitive impairment, on the grounds it is a poor 
pragmatic strategy and a legally discriminatory 
approach under the ADEA and the ADA, does not leave 
 
390. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2017). 
391. Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 
113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998). 
392. See also, Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care System, 553 
F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (a physician “does 
have standing to bring a claim pursuant to Title III of 
the ADA”). 
393. Menkowitz, 154 F.3d at 122. 
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hospitals powerless to act in securing patient 
safety. In its place, they must instead develop 
methodologies to assist in detecting compromised 
physicians, irrespective of age. Furthermore, 
taking action when medical professionals exhibit 
outlier behavior or performance, whatever its cause, 
falls within the authority of healthcare leaders. 
Leaders and organizations should thus strive to 
reliably identify and address physicians who pose 
risk to patients but not interfere with physicians 
who do not demonstrate cause for concern. 
A comprehensive and effective strategy for 
dealing with the problem of cognitive impairment 
among physicians involves three basic elements. 
First, there must be reliable and non-discriminatory 
methods for detecting performance and behavior-
related problems. Second, the organization must 
institute administrative measures to ensure proper 
and effective implementation of the detection 
system. Third, there must be a mechanism for dealing 
with the results of the detection process. This 
entails taking humane but expeditious action to 
remove dysfunctional physicians from caring for 
patients, and prompt determination and institution 
of reasonable accommodations for those who, with 
such accommodations, could practice safely. This 
Part IV will begin by briefly surveying the existing 
standards for addressing cognitive impairment 
followed by suggestions for strengthening 
implementation. 
A.  Existing Standards for Addressing Physicians with 
Behavior and/or Performance Issues 
1. Ethical Duties 
Physicians cannot serve patients as well as they 
might if they do not address their own and their 
colleagues’ human failings. Those who practice 
medicine as a profession are ethically bound to 
practice professional self-regulation, that is to 
say, conscientious self-monitoring and group 
regulation.394 Self-monitoring includes recognizing 
 
394. See Sylvia R. Cruess et al., “Profession”: A Working 
Definition for Medical Educators, 16 TEACHING & LEARNING 
MED. 74, 75 (2004) (“members are governed by codes of 
ethics and profess a commitment to competence, integrity 
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the limits of one’s expertise, maintaining awareness 
of how one’s own behavior and performance impacts 
others, and being willing to receive feedback.395 
Professional group regulation requires similar 
engagement with colleagues, including participation 
in peer review activities396 and taking action to 
safeguard patients when colleagues fail to provide 
appropriate medical care or self-correct after 
feedback.397 
Physicians are not always successful at complying 
with the ethical duty to self-monitor.398 One reason 
may be that they are reluctant to make use of medical 
services.399 Less than half of practicing physicians 
have their own physician, and they underutilize 
physician services,400 which may contribute to 
delayed recognition of conditions affecting their 
 
and morality, altruism, and the promotion of the public 
good . . . [S]ociety . . . in return grants the 
profession . . . the privilege of self-regulation. 
Professions and their members are accountable to those 
served and to society.”); Louise Arnold, Assessing 
Professional Behavior: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 
77 ACAD. MED. 502, 504 (2002) (finding that “[a]lthough 
autonomy and self-regulation may be passé due to the 
encroaching role of agencies external to 
medicine . . . these elements are more critical than 
ever if medicine is to remain a profession.”). 
395. Gerald B. Hickson & Ilene N. Moore, Professional 
Accountability and Pursuit of a Culture Of Safety, in 
PEDIATRIC SAFETY & QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 239, 241 (Karen S. Frush 
& Steven E. Krug, eds. 2014). 
396. Moore et al, supra note 57, at 1177-78. 
397. Lynn E. Webb et al., Using Coworker Observations To 
Promote Accountability For Disrespectful And Unsafe 
Behaviors By Physicians And Advanced Practice 
Professionals, 42 JOINT COMMISSION J. QUALITY PATIENT SAFETY 
149, 150, 152 (2016). 
398. See, e.g., Physician Health & Wellness, AMA Council on 
Ethical and Jud. Aff. Op. 9.3.1 (2016) (stating that 
“physicians have a responsibility to maintain their 
health and wellness . . . preventing or treating . . . 
diseases, including mental illness, disabilities, and 
occupational stress.”); John Harrison, Doctors’ Health 
and Fitness to Practise: Assessment Models, 58 OCCUPATIONAL 
MED. 318, 318 (2008). 
399. Harrison, supra note 398, at 318. 
400. Id. 
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ability to practice safely.401 Cognitive impairment 
and other illnesses can further affect judgment and 
the ability to self-monitor.402 
Reporting colleagues perceived as impaired is 
also fraught with difficulties. Even when 
professionals are aware of the ethical duty to 
report impaired or incompetent colleagues403 and have 
direct personal knowledge of an impaired colleague, 
one third to one half of physicians choose not to 
do so.404 The reasons why include believing that 
someone else already made a report; expecting that 
nothing would be done even if the report were made; 
unawareness of how to report; and concern that the 
reporting physician would suffer retaliation.405 
The American Medical Association (AMA) Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has issued two 
Opinions406 pertaining to reporting colleagues. 
Opinion 9.4.2, Reporting Incompetent or Unethical 
Behavior by Colleagues states that:  
Physicians who become aware or strongly suspect 
that conduct threatens patient welfare 
. . . should . . . [r]eport the conduct to 
appropriate clinical authorities . . . include 
notifying the peer review body of the hospital, 
or the local or state medical society when the 
physician of concern does not have hospital 
privileges . . . [r]eport directly to the state 
 
401. Id. 
402. Asmus Vogel et al., Awareness of Deficits in Mild 
Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer’s Disease: Do MCI 
Patients Have Impaired Insight?, 17 DEMENTIA & GERIATRIC 
COGNITIVE DISORDers 181, 181 (2004). 
403. Physician Health & Wellness, AMA Council on Ethical and 
Jud. Aff. Op. 9.3.2 (2016); Physician Health & Wellness, 
AMA Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff. Op. 9.4.2 (2016). 
404. DesRoches et al., supra note 7, at 187; Eric G. Campbell 
et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a 
National Survey of Physicians, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 795, 
798 (2007). 
405. DesRoches et al., supra note 7, at 191-92. 
406. See Physician Health & Wellness, AMA Council on Ethical 
and Jud. Aff. Op. 9.4.2 (2016). 
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licensing board when . . . conduct . . . poses an 
immediate threat to . . . patients..407 
Opinion 9.3.2 Physician Responsibilities to 
Impaired Colleagues adds that:  
[I]ndividually physicians have an ethical 
obligation to . . . [i]ntervene in a timely 
manner and ensure that their colleagues receive 
appropriate care and assistance from a physician 
health program . . . 408 
These Opinions raise two problems. First, they 
appear to set the threshold at which a physician is 
ethically bound to report to where there is little 
ambiguity about whether the colleague’s conduct is 
of concern. Second, once that obligation does arise, 
the reporter faces a rather staggering set of 
actions for which she is responsible, ranging from 
notifying a variety of authorities to following up 
and ensuring that the colleague was appropriately 
managed. A professional concerned about a colleague 
may feel intimidated by the process and not 
confident of back-up if she did report. Unlike other 
AMA Opinions discussing collective duties,409 the 
Opinions related to compromised colleagues neither 
charge a medical staff or hospital with making it 
easier to report nor to assure that if a report is 
filed, a designated, trained team will step in to 
manage subsequent steps.410 Thus, the AMA Ethical 
Opinions impose too heavy a burden on potential 
reporters but also do not go far enough to support 
reporting. 
 
407. Id. (emphasis added). 
408. Physician Health & Wellness, AMA Council on Ethical and 
Jud. Aff. Op. 9.3.2 (2016) (emphasis added). 
409. See, e.g., Physician Health & Wellness, AMA Council on 
Ethical and Jud. Aff. Op. 9.4.3 (2016) (discussing the 
role of medical societies in assuming responsibility for 
reporting and addressing incompetent or unethical 
physician behavior); Physician Health & Wellness, AMA 
Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff. Op. 9.4.2 (2016) 
(discussing the role of medical staff bodies in assuming 
responsibility for administering addressing disruptive 
physician behavior). 
410. Webb et al., supra note 397, at 150, 152 (2016). 
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The standards suggested by the AMA Opinions might 
prove inadequate to prevent patient harm. If 
colleagues and co-workers do not report concerns and 
observations about a physician, then there is also 
the potential for liability if that physician 
subsequently harms a patient.411 Even in the absence 
of statutes or organizational policies that 
expressly define a healthcare professional’s 
reporting duties, courts may use a profession’s 
ethical duties to extend the common law and find 
liability. The best-known example of this is 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California.412 The Court found that a psychotherapist 
whose patient named his intended victim was 
negligent because he did not directly warn the 
victim.413 The duty to warn outweighed the duty to 
maintain confidentiality of the patient’s 
sessions.414 After the decision, the California 
legislature codified the psychotherapist duty, now 
called the “duty to protect.”415 Courts could 
 
411. Feinberg, supra note 151, at 615. 
412. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cal., 551 
P.2d 334, 353, (Cal. 1976). The “duty to warn” doctrine 
dates back to the early 20th century when a physician was 
held liable for failing to warn the plaintiff’s now-
deceased husband, who had cared for a neighbor infected 
with smallpox, that it was a contagious disease. See 
Jones v. Stanko, Admx, 118 Ohio St. 147, 152-53 (Ohio 
1928) (discussing that medical professional must know 
“whether he is dealing with a disease which is 
dangerously contagious” and must “give due notice” of 
that fact). 
413. 551 P.2d at 340. 
414. Id. at 347 (“We conclude that the public policy favoring 
protection of the confidential character of patient-
psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent 
to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to 
others. The protective privilege ends where the public 
peril begins.”). 
415. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (2013) (“(a) There shall be no 
monetary liability on the part of . . . a 
psychotherapist . . . in failing to protect from a 
patient’s threatened violent behavior . . . except if the 
patient . . . communicated to the psychotherapist a 
serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably 
identifiable victim . . . (b) . . . the 
psychotherapist . . . discharges his or her duty 
to protect by making reasonable efforts to communicate the 
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potentially extend the duty to other professional 
colleagues who are aware of a physician evidencing 
impairment, and fail to act to protect his patients. 
Relying on professionals to discharge their 
ethical duties to report is too tenuous a modality 
for assuring patient safety. Without a clearly 
defined process or accessible system for reporting, 
obstacles may continue to outweigh incentives. Risk 
of retaliation by the subject of the report, 
including the possibility of a defamation suit, may 
be real.416 A prospective non-physician reporter 
might fear losing her job if reporting results in 
the physician’s departure. Potential reporters may 
be influenced by loyalty or friendship,417 and choose 
instead to cover-up for their mentor, colleague, or 
employer’s lapses.418 They may also believe that the 
leader will back off with the first utterance of 
denial or threat to sue from the physician,419 and 
thus reinforce the futility of reporting.420 
Thus, more is needed than relying on observers 
to report as an ethical duty. A reliable support 
structure is necessary to assure reporters’ 
psychological safety and freedom from retaliation. 
Similarly, leaders need to understand how to engage 
and address outlier physician performance and 
behavior in a fair and consistent process. 
 
threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement 
agency. (c) the amendments made by the act . . . change the 
name of the duty referenced in this section from a duty to 
warn and protect to a duty to protect.”). 
416. Feinberg, supra note 151, at 615. 
417. See Richard Rovit, To Everything There is a Season and 
Time to Every Purpose: Retirement and a Neurosurgeon, 
100 J. NEUROSURGERY 1123, 1128 (2004) (“a present or former 
student or associate may be unrea-sonably supportive”). 
418. See, e.g., Michael A. LaCombe, Problems of 
Professionalism: Physician Impairment, 5 AM. J. MED 654, 
655-56 (1996); Blasier, supra note 110, at 402. 
419. Hickson & Moore, supra note 395, at 248-49. 
420. Rovit, supra note 417, at 1128 (listing reasons why 
leaders may not follow-through on reports of concerning 
performance as “fear of bad publicity, legal 
entanglements, and . . . loss of . . . revenue”); 
Hickson & Moore, supra note 395, at 246-49 (discussing 
team members’ barriers to reporting and leaders’ 
barriers to taking action). 
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2. The Joint Commission Standards 
The Joint Commission (“TJC”) has compliance 
requirements or Standards that, if properly carried 
out, would identify physicians who fail to meet 
performance and behavioral expectations.421 
Hospitals are required to develop processes to 
enforce these Standards. In collaboration with their 
organized medical staff, hospitals collect 
information regarding healthcare professionals’ 
licensure, training, experience, clinical abilities, 
and competence.422 
The first set of Standards requires hospitals to 
conduct professional practice review, which 
consists of two processes: ongoing practice 
performance evaluations (“OPPE”) applied to all 
physicians,423 and focused practice performance 
evaluations (“FPPE”) for physicians whose 
performance raises concerns.424 The second set of 
Standards requires hospitals to implement a process 
addressing behaviors that undermine a culture of 
safety.425 The third set of Standards mandates a 
process separate from corrective or disciplinary 
procedures to identify and address physicians who 
appear to have health or other impairments that may 
affect their ability to practice safely.426 
Identifying physicians with apparent health or 
impairment issues occurs in the course of carrying 
out the first two Standards. 
All three sets of Standards have, at their core, 
a philosophy of ongoing surveillance and analysis 
to identify outliers and address deficiencies. The 
Standards are broken down into Elements of 
Performance (“EP”), which hospitals must implement 
 
421. See TJC Standards at MS.08.01.01. Focused Professional 
Practice Evaluation (FPPE); MS.08.01.03. Ongoing 
Professional Practice Evaluation (OPPE); SEA #40, supra 
note 377; TJC Standards at MS.11.01.01. 
422. See TJC Standards at MS.06.01.03; MS.06.01.07. 
423. TJC Standards at MS 08.01.03. 
424. TJC Standards at MS 08.01.01. 
425. SEA #40, supra note 377. 
426. TJC Standards at MS.11.01.01. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
183 
and demonstrate to TJC accreditation surveyors.427 
In addition, TJC offers implementation suggestions 
for how a hospital might proceed to meet the 
Standards.428 
The first set of standards for OPPE and FPPE 
transform the traditional “intuitive” credentialing 
and privileging process into one that is objective 
and evidenced-based.429 OPPE should be “ongoing” and 
occur no fewer than three times within the 24-month 
period between re-appointments to the medical 
staff.430 This frequency supports early 
identification of patterns or changes in patterns, 
as well as intervention.431 
The OPPE process includes review of two types of 
metrics: those universal to all medical staff, and 
those that are specialty-specific.432 Examples of 
universal metrics433 are the number of medical record 
completion delinquencies, prescribing practices, 
appropriate use of diagnostic testing, and 
complaints. Everyone with the same privileges 
 
427. See The Joint Commission, Standards BoosterPackTM for 
Focused Professional Practice Evaluation/Ongoing 
Professional Practice Evaluation (FPPE/OPPE) 17 (2011) 
[hereinafter, BoosterPack] (“Section A2: Assessing 
Compliance During the On-Site Survey.”). 
428. See e.g., id. at 12. 
429. Id. at 27. TJC Standards at MS.06.01.05 (“The decision 
to grant or deny a privilege(s), and/or to renew an 
existing privilege(s), is an objective, evidence-based 
process.”); TJC Standards at MS.08.01.03.03 
(“Information resulting from the ongoing professional 
practice evaluation is used to determine whether to 
continue, limit, or revoke any existing privileges.”). 
430. See BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 12. 
431. Id. at 8. 
432. TJC Standards at MS.08.01.03.02 (“the type of data to be 
collected is determined by individual departments and 
approved by the organized medical staff”); see also, 
Joseph R. Steele et al., The Joint Commission Practice 
Performance Evaluation: A Primer for Radiologists, 7 J. 
AM. C. RADIOLOGY 425, 426 (2010); Jared M. O’Leary et al., 
Curriculum in Interventional Cardiology: Setting Up 
Professional Standards, in TEXTBOOK OF CATHETER-BASED 
CARDIOVASCULAR INTERVENTIONS (P. Lanzer, ed. 2018) (in 
press). 
433. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 14. 
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undergoes review of the same specialty-specific 
metrics.434 OPPE metrics for surgeons, for example, 
might include wound infection rates, unplanned 
returns to the operating room,435 observed to 
expected (“O/E”) mortality ratios,436 surgical 
complication rates,437 and numbers of delinquent 
operative reports.438 Anesthesiologists’ metrics 
might include re-intubation and spinal headache 
rates,439 and for hospitalists, length of stay and 
readmission rates.440 
The organized medical staff is responsible for 
developing pre-set FPPE trigger criteria441 so that 
“issues affecting the provision of safe, high-
quality patient care”442 are identified. TJC 
regulations do not suggest that age would be a 
permissible FPPE trigger. Data that the healthcare 
organization already collects for other purposes, 
 
434. See Steele, supra note 432, at 426. 
435. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 12. See also, John D. 
Birkmeyer et al., Is Unplanned Return to the Operating 
Room a Useful Quality Indicator in General Surgery?, 136 
ARCHIVES SURGERY 405, 409 (2001). 
436. See, Applying the AHRQ Quality Indicators to Hospital 
Data, AHRQ QUALITY INDICATORS TOOLKIT, 
https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/
files/wysiwyg/professionals/systems/hospital/qitoolkit
/b1-applyingqis.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (“If a 
hospital’s Observed rate for an indicator is higher than 
its Expected rate (i.e., an O/E ratio greater than 1), 
then the hospital performed worse than the reference 
population with an equivalent patient case mix. If the 
observed rate is lower than the expected rate (i.e., an 
O/E ratio less than 1), then the hospital performed 
better than the reference population for that indicator 
with an equivalent case mix.”). 
437. Surgical complications are defined as any deviation from 
the normal postoperative course. See Daniel Dindo et 
al., Classification of Surgical Complications A New 
Proposal with Evaluation in a Cohort of 6336 Patients 
and Results of a Survey, 240 ANNALS SURGERY 205, 206 (2004). 
438. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 12. (medical record 
delinquency). 
439. Id. at 14. 
440. Id. 
441. TJC Standards at MS.08.01.01. 
442. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 4. 
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like length of stay, infection rates, repeat 
admissions, numbers of adverse events,443 and 
patient444 and co-worker complaints,445 are helpful 
sources of information, especially when multiple 
sources or domains appear to show unusual activity. 
Comparative data—individuals against their peer 
group—are also a means to surface patterns or 
unusual changes in performance or behavior that 
warrant further assessment. Single incidents, 
including sentinel events, may also trigger FPPE.446 
When triggered, the organization has a wide range 
of evaluative tools at its disposal to conduct the 
FPPE. Medical professionals need to function in 
several domains: medical knowledge, patient care, 
practice-based learning and improvement, 
understanding how to work within a health system, 
communication and interpersonal skills, and 
professionalism.447 Thus, the individualized 
assessment may include medical chart review, direct 
observation of the physician, discussing cases of 
concern with others involved in the patients’ care, 
and conducting 360o evaluations.448 
 
443. Id. 
444. Id. at 24. See also William O. Cooper et al., Patient 
Complaints Identify Surgeons With Increased Risk For 
Postoperative Complications, 152 JAMA SURGERY 522 (2017) 
(stating that patients whose surgeon has a history of 
high numbers of patient complaints are also more likely 
to experience operative or postoperative complications). 
445. SEA #40, supra, note 377. 
446. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 21. TJC defines a 
sentinel event as one that has resulted in an 
unanticipated death or major permanent loss of function 
not related to the natural course of the patient’s 
illness or underlying condition. Sentinel Events, CAMH 
(January 2013), 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/CAMH_2012_U
pdate2_24_SE.pdf. 
447. BoosterPack, supra note 427, at 3. See American Board of 
Medical Specialties, Based on Core Competencies, 
http://www.abms.org/board-certification/a-trusted-
credential/based-on-core-competencies/ (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2018). 
448. For 360o evaluations, multiple individuals within the 
physician’s sphere (e.g., nurses, other staff, physician 
colleagues, leaders) are asked to fill out measurement 
tools. The physician receives the results as feedback 
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The OPPE and FPPE rubric is entirely consistent 
with the ADA’s individualized and non-
discriminatory approach. TJC regulations allow the 
hospital an opportunity to identify physicians for 
extra scrutiny when they trigger an FPPE 
criterion.449 Leaders should be aware of the 
potential causes of deficient performance and 
behavior. While not all physicians with poor 
performance have underlying medical, psychiatric, 
neuropsychological, or substance abuse issues, some 
do. Results of OPPE and FPPE may provide the 
evidence for an employer to develop a reasonable 
belief that the employee may have a condition that 
interferes with his ability to do his job or poses 
a direct threat for which the employer may require 
examination. In contrast, physicians whose OPPE is 
satisfactory do not endure special scrutiny solely 
on the basis of age. 
A second set of TJC Standards relevant to 
monitoring physicians relates to performance 
deficiencies marked by behaviors that interfere with 
team members’ ability to care for patients450 and 
thereby “undermine a culture of safety.”451 Co-worker 
complaints are an especially rich source of data as 
only 3 percent of physicians are associated with 
three or more co-worker complaints over a 36-month 
period.452 TJC requires hospitals to conduct 
 
and the physician’s leader has information to help 
determine what resources might be needed to remediate. 
See e.g., Isser Dubinsky et al., 360-Degree Physician 
Performance Assessment, 13 HEALTHCARE Q. 71 (2010). 
449. The two circumstances for singling out individuals for 
extra scrutiny are: (1) when OPPE data trigger an FPPE 
review, see TJC Standards at MS.08.01.01.02 and 
MS.08.01.01.05, and (2) for a period after initial 
granting of privileges for new medical staff members and 
established physicians who request new privileges, see 
TJC Standards at MS.08.01.01. 
450. See Alan H. Rosenstein & Michelle O’Daniel, A Survey of 
the Impact of Disruptive Behaviors and Communication 
Defects on Patient Safety, 34 THE JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 464, 464-65 (2008); Lucian L. Leape 
et al., A Culture of Respect, Part 2: Creating a Culture 
of Respect. 87 ACAD. MED. 853, 855 (2012). 
451. SEA #40, supra note 377. 
452. Webb, supra note 397, at 154, 158 (Figure 4). 
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stepwise, tiered interventions to hold physicians 
accountable for these behaviors.453 In one model,454 
at the first tier a physician peer shares an 
anonymized co-worker report with the physician who 
is the subject of the report. If reports continue, 
intervention escalates in a stepwise fashion up 
through the administrative tiers. Should co-worker 
reports persist, leaders may use evaluative 
resources under the next set of Standards. 
The third set of TJC Standards requires medical 
staff to address health issues or other impairments 
within a process separate from a corrective or 
disciplinary procedure.455 These Standards have 
several elements. They charge the medical staff with 
designing and implementing456 processes for educating 
staff how to recognize457 and report observations of 
behavior or performance consistent with cognitive 
or other impairments;458 maintain informant 
confidentiality;459 and confidentially460 manage461 
referrals for necessary assessments462 and decision-
making.463 The core group managing the process is 
responsible for referring physicians for physical, 
mental, and neuropsychological evaluations where 
appropriate. TJC makes clear in these Standards that 
they intend case-by-case identification and 
 
453. SEA #40, supra note 377. 
454. Webb et. al., supra note 397, at 152-153; Hickson & 
Moore, supra note 395, at 260-69. 
455. TJC Standards at MS 11.01.01. 
456. Id. at MS.11.01.01. 
457. Id. at MS.11.01.01.01. 
458. Id. at MS.11.01.01.03. and 11.01.01.08. 
459. Id. at MS.11.01.01.03. 
460. Id. at MS.11.01.01.05. 
461. Id. at MS.11.01.01.10. 
462. Id. at MS.11.01.01.04. 
463. Id. at MS.09.01.01 (“The organized medical staff, 
pursuant to the medical staff bylaws, evaluates and acts 
upon reported concerns regarding a privileged 
practitioner’s clinical practice and/or competence.”). 
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management.464 These Standards also do not contain 
language about age-based screening. 
TJC’s emphasis on the importance of educating 
staff to recognize dysfunctional behavior is 
significant. Learning about signs that may indicate 
illness, substance abuse, or cognitive impairment 
may lessen denial and rationalization, and increase 
comfort with reporting. TJC’s requirement to 
establish a process outside of the corrective and 
disciplinary process is also wise. In making decisions 
based on data, the management group could determine 
whether reasonable accommodations would allow the 
physician identified with a disability to perform his 
job’s “essential functions.”465 
In sum, the TJC Standards related to undertaking 
OPPE and FPPE and intervening with physicians with 
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is a valuable 
tool for creating a non-discriminatory methodology 
for monitoring all physicians regardless of age. 
They provide a framework allowing hospitals to 
achieve their goals of delivering safe, quality care 
to patients, and treating physicians equitably with 
attention to their needs. By creating a framework 
to facilitate reporting, assessment, escalation, 
and disposition, the Standards provide process 
regularity and consistency. Importantly, they also 
establish co-worker reporting and leadership action 
as normative professional and organizational 
behaviors. Once the organization identifies 
dyscompetency or impairment, and evaluates for 
medical, psychiatric, cognitive or substance abuse 
conditions, leaders can determine if the physician 
can fully remediate, return to work with reasonable 
accommodations, go on long-term disability, or 
retire. 
 
464. Id. at MS 11.01.01 (“The medical staff implements a 
process to identify and manage matters of individual 
health for licensed independent practitioners which is 
separate from actions taken for disciplinary 
purposes.”).  
465. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(n)(2016). 
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B.  Implementing Methods for Detecting and Addressing 
Impaired Physicians 
By incorporating Standards that focus on 
physician performance and behavior into its 
accreditation process, TJC makes clear to hospitals 
that these issues matter. Physicians—both 
individually and collectively as a medical staff—
and the hospitals in which they practice, all share 
responsibility for the quality of patient care. 
Therefore, they jointly must act to identify and 
address professionals who are dyscompetent, behave 
unprofessionally or are cognitively impaired. 
To identify and act requires reliable data 
collection and analysis. Therefore, the joint 
venture needs systems to ensure that all episodes 
of unnecessary variation in behavior and performance 
are recognized, reported, and captured as data 
points. At the time of its capture, one cannot tell 
if an event is an isolated one-time occurrence or 
representative of a deeper pattern or significant 
problem. Over time, the fuller picture will emerge 
and reveal who merits a closer look. Database audits 
help identify unusual complaint patterns, such as 
where a physician who previously never or rarely 
received complaints experiences a sudden upsurge in 
the number of patients expressing concerns.466 
Sometimes, the content of a single complaint report 
is sufficient to trigger FPPE. A complaint that 
“[h]e’s been my doctor for many years, but this time 
it seemed like he didn’t know who I was” would raise 
suspicion for cognitive impairment, and the 
physician would receive prompt attention. If the 
physician is older, this is a circumstance where the 
increased variability in cognitive function seen 
with age serves to heighten suspicion of cognitive 
issues. In this case, individualized assessment for 
cognitive impairment is not only non-discriminatory 
under the ADEA and ADA, but is warranted. 
To reliably detect physicians that need focused 
attention, healthcare organizations must develop 
the necessary infrastructure to support such 
programs, including the ability to respond to 
 
466. Fathy et al., supra note 56, at E6. 
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reports of single events and patterns in a 
consistent manner. Such infrastructure requires:467 
• Leadership commitment 
• Supportive institutional policies, including 
a non-retaliation policy for good faith 
reporting 
• Sufficient resources to implement and sustain 
the programs 
• Training for co-workers to recognize 
potential dysfunction 
• Accessible and user-friendly reporting 
systems 
• Timely review of all reports, including 
identifying reports that require urgent 
handling 
• Processes to reliably deliver single reports 
to the involved physician 
• Systems for coding, aggregating, and 
analyzing reports to identify patterns and 
outliers 
• A model for delivering stepwise, tiered 
interventions 
• Training colleagues to deliver the data 
• Prompt leadership involvement when aggregated 
reports reach a predetermined agreed-upon 
threshold, or single reports meet criteria for 
undertaking specific actions, as defined by 
institutional policy or federal or state law.468 
 
467. See James W. Pichert et al., An Intervention Model that 
Promotes Accountability: Peer Messengers and 
Patient/Family Complaints, 39 THE JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 435, 438 (2013). See also, Hickson 
& Moore, supra note 395, at 253-260; Webb et al., supra 
note 397, at 150-152. 
468. See TJC Standards at MS.09.01.01.02. Reports of certain 
types of events are mandated to be referred to specific 
offices with expertise. For example, allegations of 
discrimination are referred to an organization’s EEOC 
office, and allegations of violence or threats of 
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• Escalation to the next tier when a physician 
does not respond to intervention or refuses to 
engage in the process 
• A process for careful decision-making based 
on evidence as to appropriate next steps and 
disposition, and 
• Treating identified physicians with dignity 
and respect. 
Complete discussion of how to implement 
surveillance programs for performance and behavior, 
intervene with physicians, and determine further 
needed assessments and resources falls outside the 
scope of this Article.469 However, the elements of 
committed leadership and surveillance merit 
emphasis here because of their critical importance 
to the infrastructure for detecting and addressing 
physician impairment and dyscompetency. 
Committed and effective leadership is paramount 
and central to the success of any program for 
identifying and intervening with potentially 
compromised physicians. Recent calls for age-based 
testing are likely, at least in part, a response to 
circumstances where colleagues or co-workers 
remained silent when they observed a professional 
having problems, or where leaders failed to follow 
through or take appropriate action where there was 
a need. While it is concerning to think that 
compromised physicians are practicing medicine, it 
may be more helpful to assure that leaders have the 
requisite skills to act fairly, consistently, and 
reliably. Leaders who “blink” in obvious cases are 
not likely to fare better when faced with a range 
 
violence are referred to law enforcement. In the case of 
a physician who exhibits egregious behavior, i.e. is 
engaged in a serious breach of normative behavior or 
there is evidence to suspect s/he may be impaired for 
any reason. 
469. See e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Balancing Systems 
and Individual Accountability in a Safety Culture, in 
FROM FRONT OFFICE TO FRONT LINE: ESSENTIAL ISSUES FOR HEALTH CARE, 
1-35 (Steven Berman ed., 2nd ed. 2012) (discussing the 
use of a “project bundle” as an approach for optimizing 
successful deployment and sustainability of important 
projects, especially within health systems). 
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of hard-to-interpret results after testing all of 
their older physicians. 
The infrastructure must also have methodology for 
ongoing surveillance. Without it, the result may be 
policies like those taking aim at late-career 
physicians. Without reliable processes to identify 
outlier performance and behaviors, leaders may view 
age-based cognitive testing as a way to demonstrate 
they are “doing something” in response to a 
perceived serious problem. They may further believe 
that only an age-based screening program will give 
them the “objective” testing data they need to act. 
Yet, because such “fishing expeditions” are 
discriminatory and fail to evaluate all members of 
the medical staff, hospitals need an alternative 
approach. By following TJC Standards related to 
performance and behavior; implementing the elements 
of the infrastructure, including monitoring and 
analyzing data for all physicians; following the 
EEOC ADA guidance; and offering a dignified process 
for potentially compromised physicians, an 
organization will achieve a nondiscriminatory 
process that also protects patient safety. 
One remaining issue is to determine how to 
monitor physicians unaffiliated with a larger 
practice, hospital, or health system. In these 
circumstances, state medical boards could step in. 
The role of state administrative oversight is 
especially important for physicians in solo 
practice. States already receive complaints about 
physicians.470 Whereas medical boards currently may 
only assess each complaint for “face validity,”471 
adding methodology to code all received complaints, 
aggregate, and then analyze the data for patterns 
would help identify outlier physicians. Another 
option for monitoring unaffiliated physicians would 
be to develop a process similar to what CPSO does 
in Ontario, in which licensing board representatives 
 
470. See, e.g. James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, Physicians 
Disciplined by a State Medical Board, 279 JAMA 1889, 
1889 (1998) (finding that 63% of complaints reported to 
the California Medical Board are made by the public, 19% 
are from government agencies, and 14% are from 
insurers); Clay & Conatser, supra note 152, at 82. 
471. Morrison & Wickersham, supra note 470, at 1889. 
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visit practices and perform a practice assessment. 
If the physician demonstrates dyscompetency, the 
state would refer for further evaluation and 
potential remediation. 
C.  The Challenge of Providing Reasonable 
Accommodations for Cognitive Impairment 
 In compliance with the ADA, a healthcare 
organization must determine whether an employee with 
cognitive impairment can perform her job with or 
without reasonable accommodations.472 Such accom-
modations may include: switching the practice over 
to office-based from procedure-based, scheduling 
longer appointment times with each patient, using 
memory aids, and seeking input from professional 
colleagues.473 From the physician’s perspective, 
these accommodations may be sufficient to support 
her ability to practice safely. In a real sense, 
however, the organization must dedicate itself to 
monitoring surveillance data and performing regular 
job-related medical examinations to evaluate 
whether the accommodations are sufficient. The 
status of a physician whose current cognitive 
function is adequate to perform the job’s essential 
functions may change over time, with the rate of 
decline more rapid than expected. 
Hospitals should also consider the patient’s 
perspective. While some patients might accept 
treatment by a physician with cognitive impairment, 
some will not. Informed consent cannot remedy any 
discrepancy between the care the patient should 
receive from that physician and what the physician 
actually is able to provide.474 Thus, it may be that 
a physician who has been diagnosed with cognitive 
impairment should not continue in practice even if 
accommodations might somewhat ameliorate 
contributing stressors or the impact of the 
disability on patient care.475 Moreover, because the 
 
472. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(2017); C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i-iii) 
(2016). 
473. Moutier, supra note 110, at 19. 
474. See 42 C.F.R. 482.13 (c)(2) The patient has the right 
to receive care in a safe setting. 
475. There are currently no tools that can predict the impact 
of cognitive impairment on a practice. See text and 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Screening Older Physicians for Cognitive Impairment: 
Justifiable or Discriminatory? 
194 
most salient major life activity476 impacted in 
physicians with cognitive impairment is 
“thinking,”477 perhaps practicing medicine is one job 
for which no reasonable accommodations exist that 
sufficiently compensate. The ideal middle ground, 
honoring the physician’s desire to continue 
practicing and the patient’s need for safety, may 
require an accommodation of close supervision by 
another physician. If such an accommodation posed 
“undue hardship” to the hospital478 and, therefore, 
was not reasonable under the ADA, then the physician 
would need to separate, either by retiring or going 
on disability. 
 
accompanying notes to Thompson, supra note 140, and text 
and accompanying notes to Adler & Constantinou, supra 
note 141. 
476. See Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 
(10th Cir.2000), citing Pack v. Kmart Corp. 166 
F.3d1300,1305 (10th Cir.1999) (“That term has been 
construed to mean a ‘basic activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform with little 
or no difficulty.’”). 
477. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(a)(2)(A) (2008) (adding “thinking” as 
part of the definition of “major life activities”); See 
Sanchez v. ACAA, 246 F.Supp.2d 61,71-2 (2003) 
(“[Plaintiff] has presented sufficient facts regarding 
his mental condition, and particularly regarding his 
capacity to think as compared to the general population, 
to create a triable issue on this score”.); Taylor v. 
Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3rd 
Cir.1999) (“We accept that thinking is a major life 
activity.”); Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 903 (7th 
Cir.2002) (“[ . . . ]his impairment substantially 
limits his ability to think and care for 
himself[ . . . ]”); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 
F.3d 492 (10th Cir.2000). 
478. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2016). See Bates v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 511 F.3d 996-997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To show 
that ‘‘performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable 
accommodation,’’ the employer must demonstrate either 
that no reasonable accommodation currently available 
would cure the performance deficiency or that such 
reasonable accommodation poses an ‘‘undue hardship’’ on 
the employer. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(a), 12111(10) 
(2006).”). 
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V. Conclusions 
Over-concern about older physicians’ competency 
and cognition, and the failure of the medical 
community to report or take action when warranted, 
are behind the drive to implement age-based 
cognitive screening programs for late-career 
physicians. Current proposals to screen all older 
physicians waste resources and represent a poor 
pragmatic strategy that will lead to unwarranted 
scrutiny of large numbers of competent physicians, 
under-identification of non-targeted individuals 
who actually pose risk to patients, and 
discrimination under the ADEA and the ADA. 
Healthcare organizations should instead develop 
comprehensive and effective plans to identify 
physicians of all ages whose impairment or 
dyscompetency can affect patient safety. 
The focus should be on supporting systems that 
collect and use performance data to identify outlier 
physician behavior or performance, concentrating 
efforts on elucidating the reasons for the outlier 
status, and assuring that leaders reliably address 
potentially impaired physicians. The approach 
recommended in this Article involves three basic 
elements: first, the healthcare organization should 
use reliable and non-discriminatory methods to 
detect physicians with outlier performance and 
behavior by strengthening their surveillance and 
assessment systems. These systems would include a 
vigorous OPPE/FPPE program to receive and analyze 
physician data from multiple domains, including 
metrics for quality indicators, compliance 
requirements, and patient and staff complaints. 
Second, the systems should include accessible 
reporting tools for the entire workforce, and prompt 
review and management of all reports. Third, leaders 
need to establish a protected venue, such as a 
wellness committee, from which they coordinate 
assessments to help determine which physicians: 
require remediation; can practice safely with 
reasonable accommodations and monitoring; or need 
to separate from the organization. Throughout the 
process, healthcare organizations must treat 
physicians with dignity and respect. 
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The framework is ready. The incentives and 
regulatory authority are in place. Healthcare 
leaders now must monitor and act to ensure that 
medical professionals practice safely, and not allow 
discriminatory impulses to distract them. 
